An analytic-critical look at G. E. Moore's views of the relation between "Intuition" and justifying moral judgments
In this paper, I have tried to answer, by an analytic-critical method, to this question: What is the relation between moral intuition and justifying moral judgments from Moore's viewpoint? For answering to this question, by distinguishing the two meanings of "Intuition" in Moore'...
Main Author: | Aliakbar Abdulabadi |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
University of Tabriz
2015-10-01
|
Series: | Philosophical Investigations |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_3715_635.html |
Similar Items
-
Sentimentalism, Affective Response, and the Justification of Normative Moral Judgments
by: Menken, Kyle
Published: (2007) -
Sentimentalism, Affective Response, and the Justification of Normative Moral Judgments
by: Menken, Kyle
Published: (2007) -
Illumination and Intuition in Plato
by: Maryam Soltani kohanestani, et al.
Published: (2014-05-01) -
A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments
by: Rafael Vogelmann -
Virtual morality: Transitioning from moral judgment to moral action?
by: Francis, Kathryn B., et al.
Published: (2019)