On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated Equilibrium

I study the path properties of adaptive heuristics that mimic the natural dynamics of play in a game and converge to the set of correlated equilibria. Despite their apparent differences, I show that these heuristics have an abstract representation as a sequence of probability distributions that sati...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Ayan Bhattacharya
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Published:	MDPI AG 2019-01-01
Series:	Games
Subjects:	adaptive heuristics correlated equilibrium convergence repeated games algorithmic play
Online Access:	https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/10/1/6

id	doaj-30a683e2b59348f1b4a8c588c15596b3
record_format	Article
spelling	doaj-30a683e2b59348f1b4a8c588c15596b32020-11-25T01:06:23ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362019-01-01101610.3390/g10010006g10010006On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated EquilibriumAyan Bhattacharya0Bert W. Wasserman Department of Economics and Finance, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, The City University of New York, New York, NY 10010, USAI study the path properties of adaptive heuristics that mimic the natural dynamics of play in a game and converge to the set of correlated equilibria. Despite their apparent differences, I show that these heuristics have an abstract representation as a sequence of probability distributions that satisfy a number of common properties. These properties arise due to the topological structure of the set of correlated equilibria. The characterizations that I obtain have useful applications in the study of the convergence of the heuristics.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/10/1/6adaptive heuristicscorrelated equilibriumconvergencerepeated gamesalgorithmic play
collection	DOAJ
language	English
format	Article
sources	DOAJ
author	Ayan Bhattacharya
spellingShingle	Ayan Bhattacharya On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated Equilibrium Games adaptive heuristics correlated equilibrium convergence repeated games algorithmic play
author_facet	Ayan Bhattacharya
author_sort	Ayan Bhattacharya
title	On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated Equilibrium
title_short	On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated Equilibrium
title_full	On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated Equilibrium
title_fullStr	On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated Equilibrium
title_full_unstemmed	On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated Equilibrium
title_sort	on adaptive heuristics that converge to correlated equilibrium
publisher	MDPI AG
series	Games
issn	2073-4336
publishDate	2019-01-01
description	I study the path properties of adaptive heuristics that mimic the natural dynamics of play in a game and converge to the set of correlated equilibria. Despite their apparent differences, I show that these heuristics have an abstract representation as a sequence of probability distributions that satisfy a number of common properties. These properties arise due to the topological structure of the set of correlated equilibria. The characterizations that I obtain have useful applications in the study of the convergence of the heuristics.
topic	adaptive heuristics correlated equilibrium convergence repeated games algorithmic play
url	https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/10/1/6
work_keys_str_mv	AT ayanbhattacharya onadaptiveheuristicsthatconvergetocorrelatedequilibrium
_version_	1725190543104802816

On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated Equilibrium

Similar Items