Union Bargaining in an Oligopoly Market with Cournot-Bertrand Competition: Welfare and Policy Implications
We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this mode...
Main Authors: | Elizabeth Schroeder, Victor J. Tremblay |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2014-03-01
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Series: | Economies |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/2/2/95 |
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