The perils of plurality rule and the major(itarian) effect of cabinet composition on human rights in presidential democracies
I argue that when presidents are able (or forced) to cobble together broad-based coalitions to win an absolute majority, their administrations are less likely (and less able) to violate human rights, in comparison to presidential administrations whose victories are the result of a narrow plurality....
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
SAGE Publishing
2018-08-01
|
Series: | Research & Politics |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018794753 |
id |
doaj-342932cbc77349ce8e3ef7aabf412285 |
---|---|
record_format |
Article |
spelling |
doaj-342932cbc77349ce8e3ef7aabf4122852020-11-25T03:26:37ZengSAGE PublishingResearch & Politics2053-16802018-08-01510.1177/2053168018794753The perils of plurality rule and the major(itarian) effect of cabinet composition on human rights in presidential democraciesJoshua HolzerI argue that when presidents are able (or forced) to cobble together broad-based coalitions to win an absolute majority, their administrations are less likely (and less able) to violate human rights, in comparison to presidential administrations whose victories are the result of a narrow plurality. Consistent with this argument, I find cabinets comprised of a higher percentage of individuals from parties other than that of the president to be associated with greater government respect for human rights. Additionally, I find that in the years after a presidential election won by an absolute majority, states are more likely to experience an increase in government respect for human rights, in comparison to the years after a presidential election won by a mere plurality. Utilizing an original dataset of cabinet composition for 35 presidential democracies spanning from 2001 to 2011, this study concludes that it may prudent for non-majoritarian systems to consider adopting a mandatory majority rule so to encourage the types of conciliatory alliances that appear to promote high human rights respect.https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018794753 |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Joshua Holzer |
spellingShingle |
Joshua Holzer The perils of plurality rule and the major(itarian) effect of cabinet composition on human rights in presidential democracies Research & Politics |
author_facet |
Joshua Holzer |
author_sort |
Joshua Holzer |
title |
The perils of plurality rule and the major(itarian) effect of cabinet composition on human rights in presidential democracies |
title_short |
The perils of plurality rule and the major(itarian) effect of cabinet composition on human rights in presidential democracies |
title_full |
The perils of plurality rule and the major(itarian) effect of cabinet composition on human rights in presidential democracies |
title_fullStr |
The perils of plurality rule and the major(itarian) effect of cabinet composition on human rights in presidential democracies |
title_full_unstemmed |
The perils of plurality rule and the major(itarian) effect of cabinet composition on human rights in presidential democracies |
title_sort |
perils of plurality rule and the major(itarian) effect of cabinet composition on human rights in presidential democracies |
publisher |
SAGE Publishing |
series |
Research & Politics |
issn |
2053-1680 |
publishDate |
2018-08-01 |
description |
I argue that when presidents are able (or forced) to cobble together broad-based coalitions to win an absolute majority, their administrations are less likely (and less able) to violate human rights, in comparison to presidential administrations whose victories are the result of a narrow plurality. Consistent with this argument, I find cabinets comprised of a higher percentage of individuals from parties other than that of the president to be associated with greater government respect for human rights. Additionally, I find that in the years after a presidential election won by an absolute majority, states are more likely to experience an increase in government respect for human rights, in comparison to the years after a presidential election won by a mere plurality. Utilizing an original dataset of cabinet composition for 35 presidential democracies spanning from 2001 to 2011, this study concludes that it may prudent for non-majoritarian systems to consider adopting a mandatory majority rule so to encourage the types of conciliatory alliances that appear to promote high human rights respect. |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018794753 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT joshuaholzer theperilsofpluralityruleandthemajoritarianeffectofcabinetcompositiononhumanrightsinpresidentialdemocracies AT joshuaholzer perilsofpluralityruleandthemajoritarianeffectofcabinetcompositiononhumanrightsinpresidentialdemocracies |
_version_ |
1724591777943388160 |