Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments
In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all players receive equal incentives from the common pool. The que...
Main Authors: | Xiaojie eChen, Matjaž ePerc |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2014-07-01
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Series: | Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00248/full |
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