Successful Nash Equilibrium Agent for a Three-Player Imperfect-Information Game

• Main Authors: Sam Ganzfried, Austin Nowak, Joannier Pinales
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: MDPI AG 2018-06-01
• Series: Games
• Subjects: artificial intelligence; game theory; Nash equilibrium; imperfect information
• Online Access: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/2/33

Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, but no guarantees in non-zero-sum games or in games with more than two players. We describe an agent that is able to defeat a variety of realistic opponents using an exact Nash equilibrium strategy in a three-player imperfect-information game. This shows that, despite a lack of theoretical guarantees, agents based on Nash equilibrium strategies can be successful in multiplayer games after all.