Double-Sided Energy Auction in Microgrid: Equilibrium Under Price Anticipation
This paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double-sided energy auction involving buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be implemented by an aggregator, as well as a possible approach by which the a...
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doaj-3757384c70bc4db596af2231670de7a42021-03-29T19:41:53ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362016-01-0143794380510.1109/ACCESS.2016.25919127514252Double-Sided Energy Auction in Microgrid: Equilibrium Under Price AnticipationM. Nazif Faqiry0Sanjoy Das1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0699-1848Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, USAElectrical and Computer Engineering Department, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, USAThis paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double-sided energy auction involving buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be implemented by an aggregator, as well as a possible approach by which the agents may approximate price anticipation is considered. Equilibrium conditions arising due to price anticipation is analyzed. A modified auction to mitigate the resulting loss in efficiency due to such behavior is suggested. This modified auction allows the aggregate social welfare of the agents to be arbitrarily close to that attainable with price taking agents. Next, equilibrium conditions when the aggregator collects a surcharge price per unit of energy traded is examined. A bi-objective optimization problem is identified that takes into account both the agents' social welfare as well as the aggregator's revenue from the surcharge. The results of extensive simulations, which corroborate the theoretical analysis, are reported.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7514252/Energy gridmicrogridaggregatoragentstradingauction |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
M. Nazif Faqiry Sanjoy Das |
spellingShingle |
M. Nazif Faqiry Sanjoy Das Double-Sided Energy Auction in Microgrid: Equilibrium Under Price Anticipation IEEE Access Energy grid microgrid aggregator agents trading auction |
author_facet |
M. Nazif Faqiry Sanjoy Das |
author_sort |
M. Nazif Faqiry |
title |
Double-Sided Energy Auction in Microgrid: Equilibrium Under Price Anticipation |
title_short |
Double-Sided Energy Auction in Microgrid: Equilibrium Under Price Anticipation |
title_full |
Double-Sided Energy Auction in Microgrid: Equilibrium Under Price Anticipation |
title_fullStr |
Double-Sided Energy Auction in Microgrid: Equilibrium Under Price Anticipation |
title_full_unstemmed |
Double-Sided Energy Auction in Microgrid: Equilibrium Under Price Anticipation |
title_sort |
double-sided energy auction in microgrid: equilibrium under price anticipation |
publisher |
IEEE |
series |
IEEE Access |
issn |
2169-3536 |
publishDate |
2016-01-01 |
description |
This paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double-sided energy auction involving buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be implemented by an aggregator, as well as a possible approach by which the agents may approximate price anticipation is considered. Equilibrium conditions arising due to price anticipation is analyzed. A modified auction to mitigate the resulting loss in efficiency due to such behavior is suggested. This modified auction allows the aggregate social welfare of the agents to be arbitrarily close to that attainable with price taking agents. Next, equilibrium conditions when the aggregator collects a surcharge price per unit of energy traded is examined. A bi-objective optimization problem is identified that takes into account both the agents' social welfare as well as the aggregator's revenue from the surcharge. The results of extensive simulations, which corroborate the theoretical analysis, are reported. |
topic |
Energy grid microgrid aggregator agents trading auction |
url |
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7514252/ |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT mnaziffaqiry doublesidedenergyauctioninmicrogridequilibriumunderpriceanticipation AT sanjoydas doublesidedenergyauctioninmicrogridequilibriumunderpriceanticipation |
_version_ |
1724195813943410688 |