Sustainable Gains: Dutch Investment and Bureaucratic Rationality in Eighteenth-Century Saxon Mines

A late-eighteenth-century encounter between Dutch merchants and cameralist Saxon officials is used to argue two related points. First, the history of knowledge can help us rethink hierarchical power structures like the Saxon mining bureaucracy. Mine owners had a right to information and could not be...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sebastian Felten
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Ubiquity Press 2020-12-01
Series:Journal for the History of Knowledge
Subjects:
Online Access:https://journalhistoryknowledge.org/articles/19
id doaj-388537e9e7e64983a8aec5d1af0bb9a1
record_format Article
spelling doaj-388537e9e7e64983a8aec5d1af0bb9a12021-10-02T17:44:21ZengUbiquity PressJournal for the History of Knowledge2632-282X2020-12-011110.5334/jhk.1912Sustainable Gains: Dutch Investment and Bureaucratic Rationality in Eighteenth-Century Saxon MinesSebastian Felten0Universität WienA late-eighteenth-century encounter between Dutch merchants and cameralist Saxon officials is used to argue two related points. First, the history of knowledge can help us rethink hierarchical power structures like the Saxon mining bureaucracy. Mine owners had a right to information and could not be forced to pay contributions, which meant that mining officials were solicitous in sharing knowledge, fretted about investors’ favor, and took their desire for revenue into consideration. These observations directly challenge the traditional absolutist image of the Saxon mining bureaucracy. Second, the history of knowledge can help explain how certain rationalities (that is, combinations of means, ends, and values) came into being. Saxon officials sought to situate short-term income and expense in a success story that spanned decades and centuries. Informed by the concept of 'Nachhalt' (sustainability), Saxon officials saw profit even in mines that lost money. This kind of sustainability thinking is best explained via the archival practices of the mining bureaucracy: officials collected information from yield sheets and local lore in order to calculate long-term outputs, to speculate about untapped deposits, and to disburse as little profit as possible. When the Dutch eventually understood this rationality, they withdrew. Saxony’s early modern mining bureaucracy was dismantled by liberal reforms in 1850s, but its peculiar brand of sustainability, aiming to extract resources at almost all costs, likely survived the dawn of industrial capitalism as young engineers and administrators became versed in it at the Freiberg Mining Academy. This article is part of a special issue entitled “Histories of Bureaucratic Knowledge,” edited by Sebastian Felten and Christine von Oertzen.https://journalhistoryknowledge.org/articles/19saxonybureaucracysustainabilityminingsurinamehybrid expertsarchives
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Sebastian Felten
spellingShingle Sebastian Felten
Sustainable Gains: Dutch Investment and Bureaucratic Rationality in Eighteenth-Century Saxon Mines
Journal for the History of Knowledge
saxony
bureaucracy
sustainability
mining
suriname
hybrid experts
archives
author_facet Sebastian Felten
author_sort Sebastian Felten
title Sustainable Gains: Dutch Investment and Bureaucratic Rationality in Eighteenth-Century Saxon Mines
title_short Sustainable Gains: Dutch Investment and Bureaucratic Rationality in Eighteenth-Century Saxon Mines
title_full Sustainable Gains: Dutch Investment and Bureaucratic Rationality in Eighteenth-Century Saxon Mines
title_fullStr Sustainable Gains: Dutch Investment and Bureaucratic Rationality in Eighteenth-Century Saxon Mines
title_full_unstemmed Sustainable Gains: Dutch Investment and Bureaucratic Rationality in Eighteenth-Century Saxon Mines
title_sort sustainable gains: dutch investment and bureaucratic rationality in eighteenth-century saxon mines
publisher Ubiquity Press
series Journal for the History of Knowledge
issn 2632-282X
publishDate 2020-12-01
description A late-eighteenth-century encounter between Dutch merchants and cameralist Saxon officials is used to argue two related points. First, the history of knowledge can help us rethink hierarchical power structures like the Saxon mining bureaucracy. Mine owners had a right to information and could not be forced to pay contributions, which meant that mining officials were solicitous in sharing knowledge, fretted about investors’ favor, and took their desire for revenue into consideration. These observations directly challenge the traditional absolutist image of the Saxon mining bureaucracy. Second, the history of knowledge can help explain how certain rationalities (that is, combinations of means, ends, and values) came into being. Saxon officials sought to situate short-term income and expense in a success story that spanned decades and centuries. Informed by the concept of 'Nachhalt' (sustainability), Saxon officials saw profit even in mines that lost money. This kind of sustainability thinking is best explained via the archival practices of the mining bureaucracy: officials collected information from yield sheets and local lore in order to calculate long-term outputs, to speculate about untapped deposits, and to disburse as little profit as possible. When the Dutch eventually understood this rationality, they withdrew. Saxony’s early modern mining bureaucracy was dismantled by liberal reforms in 1850s, but its peculiar brand of sustainability, aiming to extract resources at almost all costs, likely survived the dawn of industrial capitalism as young engineers and administrators became versed in it at the Freiberg Mining Academy. This article is part of a special issue entitled “Histories of Bureaucratic Knowledge,” edited by Sebastian Felten and Christine von Oertzen.
topic saxony
bureaucracy
sustainability
mining
suriname
hybrid experts
archives
url https://journalhistoryknowledge.org/articles/19
work_keys_str_mv AT sebastianfelten sustainablegainsdutchinvestmentandbureaucraticrationalityineighteenthcenturysaxonmines
_version_ 1716850615460560896