Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach

This article outlines a New Institutional Economics’ approach of rural credit. The mainstream relies in the understanding that the rural credit contracts are hybrid forms in response to the agrichain´s complexity. The object of the research was operational credit contract for soybeans farms. The res...

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Main Authors: Luciana Florêncio de Almeida, Décio Zylbersztajn
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing - ESPM 2009-03-01
Series:Internext: Revista Eletrônica de Negócios Internacionais
Subjects:
Online Access:https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/77
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spelling doaj-435302230e4a48c2a0e6200c64863a3b2020-11-25T03:00:35ZengEscola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing - ESPMInternext: Revista Eletrônica de Negócios Internacionais1980-48652009-03-013226728710.18568/1980-4865.32267-28774Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approachLuciana Florêncio de Almeida0Décio Zylbersztajn1ESPMUSPThis article outlines a New Institutional Economics’ approach of rural credit. The mainstream relies in the understanding that the rural credit contracts are hybrid forms in response to the agrichain´s complexity. The object of the research was operational credit contract for soybeans farms. The research consisted on qualitative researches in the extent that they sought to comprehend in a more profound level the rules of game for the rural financing contracting environment based on the economic agent’s perceptions. The results highlighted the agent’s perception that the judicial system is not strong enough to performance an efficient enforcement of the contracts. In response to this institutional challenge, the agents and the government manage adaptations in the contracts, which has been successful in the agent’s point of view. In the other hand, the informational system has showed weaknesses in protecting the creditor’s right. This scenario open breaches to opportunist actions and adverse selection. In order to mitigate these problems the agents govern interdependent transactions as a tool for risk sharing.https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/77instituiçõescontratoscrédito agrícola.
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Luciana Florêncio de Almeida
Décio Zylbersztajn
spellingShingle Luciana Florêncio de Almeida
Décio Zylbersztajn
Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach
Internext: Revista Eletrônica de Negócios Internacionais
instituições
contratos
crédito agrícola.
author_facet Luciana Florêncio de Almeida
Décio Zylbersztajn
author_sort Luciana Florêncio de Almeida
title Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach
title_short Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach
title_full Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach
title_fullStr Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach
title_full_unstemmed Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach
title_sort rural credit in brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach
publisher Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing - ESPM
series Internext: Revista Eletrônica de Negócios Internacionais
issn 1980-4865
publishDate 2009-03-01
description This article outlines a New Institutional Economics’ approach of rural credit. The mainstream relies in the understanding that the rural credit contracts are hybrid forms in response to the agrichain´s complexity. The object of the research was operational credit contract for soybeans farms. The research consisted on qualitative researches in the extent that they sought to comprehend in a more profound level the rules of game for the rural financing contracting environment based on the economic agent’s perceptions. The results highlighted the agent’s perception that the judicial system is not strong enough to performance an efficient enforcement of the contracts. In response to this institutional challenge, the agents and the government manage adaptations in the contracts, which has been successful in the agent’s point of view. In the other hand, the informational system has showed weaknesses in protecting the creditor’s right. This scenario open breaches to opportunist actions and adverse selection. In order to mitigate these problems the agents govern interdependent transactions as a tool for risk sharing.
topic instituições
contratos
crédito agrícola.
url https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/77
work_keys_str_mv AT lucianaflorenciodealmeida ruralcreditinbrazilcontratsevolutionataninstitutionalapproach
AT deciozylbersztajn ruralcreditinbrazilcontratsevolutionataninstitutionalapproach
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