Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach
This article outlines a New Institutional Economics’ approach of rural credit. The mainstream relies in the understanding that the rural credit contracts are hybrid forms in response to the agrichain´s complexity. The object of the research was operational credit contract for soybeans farms. The res...
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Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing - ESPM
2009-03-01
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Online Access: | https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/77 |
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doaj-435302230e4a48c2a0e6200c64863a3b2020-11-25T03:00:35ZengEscola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing - ESPMInternext: Revista Eletrônica de Negócios Internacionais1980-48652009-03-013226728710.18568/1980-4865.32267-28774Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approachLuciana Florêncio de Almeida0Décio Zylbersztajn1ESPMUSPThis article outlines a New Institutional Economics’ approach of rural credit. The mainstream relies in the understanding that the rural credit contracts are hybrid forms in response to the agrichain´s complexity. The object of the research was operational credit contract for soybeans farms. The research consisted on qualitative researches in the extent that they sought to comprehend in a more profound level the rules of game for the rural financing contracting environment based on the economic agent’s perceptions. The results highlighted the agent’s perception that the judicial system is not strong enough to performance an efficient enforcement of the contracts. In response to this institutional challenge, the agents and the government manage adaptations in the contracts, which has been successful in the agent’s point of view. In the other hand, the informational system has showed weaknesses in protecting the creditor’s right. This scenario open breaches to opportunist actions and adverse selection. In order to mitigate these problems the agents govern interdependent transactions as a tool for risk sharing.https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/77instituiçõescontratoscrédito agrícola. |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Luciana Florêncio de Almeida Décio Zylbersztajn |
spellingShingle |
Luciana Florêncio de Almeida Décio Zylbersztajn Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach Internext: Revista Eletrônica de Negócios Internacionais instituições contratos crédito agrícola. |
author_facet |
Luciana Florêncio de Almeida Décio Zylbersztajn |
author_sort |
Luciana Florêncio de Almeida |
title |
Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach |
title_short |
Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach |
title_full |
Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach |
title_fullStr |
Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach |
title_full_unstemmed |
Rural credit in Brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach |
title_sort |
rural credit in brazil: contrat's evolution at an institutional approach |
publisher |
Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing - ESPM |
series |
Internext: Revista Eletrônica de Negócios Internacionais |
issn |
1980-4865 |
publishDate |
2009-03-01 |
description |
This article outlines a New Institutional Economics’ approach of rural credit. The mainstream relies in the understanding that the rural credit contracts are hybrid forms in response to the agrichain´s complexity. The object of the research was operational credit contract for soybeans farms. The research consisted on qualitative researches in the extent that they sought to comprehend in a more profound level the rules of game for the rural financing contracting environment based on the economic agent’s perceptions. The results highlighted the agent’s perception that the judicial system is not strong enough to performance an efficient enforcement of the contracts. In response to this institutional challenge, the agents and the government manage adaptations in the contracts, which has been successful in the agent’s point of view. In the other hand, the informational system has showed weaknesses in protecting the creditor’s right. This scenario open breaches to opportunist actions and adverse selection. In order to mitigate these problems the agents govern interdependent transactions as a tool for risk sharing. |
topic |
instituições contratos crédito agrícola. |
url |
https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/77 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT lucianaflorenciodealmeida ruralcreditinbrazilcontratsevolutionataninstitutionalapproach AT deciozylbersztajn ruralcreditinbrazilcontratsevolutionataninstitutionalapproach |
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1724697328074358784 |