Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements
Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent over international (trade) agreements, enabling it to threaten a veto. Due to the extensive financial and reputational costs associated with a veto, the European Commission (hereinafter Commission) was...
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2021-07-01
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doaj-45ad12641b50477aac8fa4a6599422c82021-07-30T10:19:48ZengCogitatioPolitics and Governance2183-24632021-07-0193748410.17645/pag.v9i3.40142091Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade AgreementsMarie Peffenköver0Johan Adriaensen1Independent Researcher, BelgiumFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, The NetherlandsSince the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent over international (trade) agreements, enabling it to threaten a veto. Due to the extensive financial and reputational costs associated with a veto, the European Commission (hereinafter Commission) was expected to read these threats effectively. However, the Commission’s responses to such threats have varied greatly. Building on a fine-grained causal mechanism derived from information processing theory and an extensive process-tracing analysis of seven free trade agreements post-Lisbon, we explain why the Commission has responded differently to looming vetoes. Our analysis reveals that the variation in Commission responses derives from imperfections in its information-processing system, the ‘early-warning system,’ which had to be adapted to the new institutional equilibrium post-Lisbon. Because of this adaption process, factors exogenous to the parliamentary context (‘externalities’) as well as internal uncertainties (‘internalities’) add constant unpredictability to the Commission’s reading of the European Parliament.https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/4014eu trade policyeuropean commissioneuropean parliamentinformation processing theorytrade agreementsveto |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Marie Peffenköver Johan Adriaensen |
spellingShingle |
Marie Peffenköver Johan Adriaensen Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements Politics and Governance eu trade policy european commission european parliament information processing theory trade agreements veto |
author_facet |
Marie Peffenköver Johan Adriaensen |
author_sort |
Marie Peffenköver |
title |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
title_short |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
title_full |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
title_fullStr |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
title_full_unstemmed |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
title_sort |
detecting looming vetoes: getting the european parliament’s consent in trade agreements |
publisher |
Cogitatio |
series |
Politics and Governance |
issn |
2183-2463 |
publishDate |
2021-07-01 |
description |
Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent over international (trade) agreements, enabling it to threaten a veto. Due to the extensive financial and reputational costs associated with a veto, the European Commission (hereinafter Commission) was expected to read these threats effectively. However, the Commission’s responses to such threats have varied greatly. Building on a fine-grained causal mechanism derived from information processing theory and an extensive process-tracing analysis of seven free trade agreements post-Lisbon, we explain why the Commission has responded differently to looming vetoes. Our analysis reveals that the variation in Commission responses derives from imperfections in its information-processing system, the ‘early-warning system,’ which had to be adapted to the new institutional equilibrium post-Lisbon. Because of this adaption process, factors exogenous to the parliamentary context (‘externalities’) as well as internal uncertainties (‘internalities’) add constant unpredictability to the Commission’s reading of the European Parliament. |
topic |
eu trade policy european commission european parliament information processing theory trade agreements veto |
url |
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/4014 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT mariepeffenkover detectingloomingvetoesgettingtheeuropeanparliamentsconsentintradeagreements AT johanadriaensen detectingloomingvetoesgettingtheeuropeanparliamentsconsentintradeagreements |
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