Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.

When outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) occur in OIE member countries with until then disease-free status, member countries can use 'compartmentalisation'. A compartment may be defined as a subset of farms under a common management system, complying with certain stringen...

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Main Authors: T J Hagenaars, G J Boender, R H M Bergevoet, H J W van Roermund
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2018-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207076
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spelling doaj-47c710d969fe4475a62c0becf990da2e2021-03-03T21:05:19ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032018-01-011311e020707610.1371/journal.pone.0207076Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.T J HagenaarsG J BoenderR H M BergevoetH J W van RoermundWhen outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) occur in OIE member countries with until then disease-free status, member countries can use 'compartmentalisation'. A compartment may be defined as a subset of farms under a common management system, complying with certain stringent surveillance, control and biosecurity measures, and based on that may receive a disease-free status. Based on this disease-free status the compartment is exempted from certain transport restrictions coming into force in case of outbreaks occurring in the country. For deciding whether a candidate compartment is granted official compartment status, it is relevant to assess the additional HPAI transmission risks that would arise due to the exemptions granted. These risks consist of both additional local transmission risks as well as the additional risk of a 'jump' of HPAI infection from one poultry area, via the compartment, to another area. Here such risk assessment is carried out using a spatial mathematical model for between-farm transmission in the Netherlands, yielding insight in the roles of compartment composition and contact structure and identify relevant evaluation criteria for granting HPAI compartment status. At the core of this model are transmission probabilities associated with indirect between-farm contacts, e.g. through feed delivery, egg collection and professional visitors. These probabilities were estimated from Dutch epidemic outbreak data in earlier work. The additional risk of a jump of HPAI from one area, via the compartment, to another area is calculated relative to the direct jump risk. The results show that additional transmission risks caused by a compartment to other farms are mainly dependent on the distance of densely populated poultry areas (DPPAs) to the nearest compartment farm. Apart from conditions on these distances, we also recommend specific routing requirements for transport and other movements within the compartment.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207076
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author T J Hagenaars
G J Boender
R H M Bergevoet
H J W van Roermund
spellingShingle T J Hagenaars
G J Boender
R H M Bergevoet
H J W van Roermund
Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.
PLoS ONE
author_facet T J Hagenaars
G J Boender
R H M Bergevoet
H J W van Roermund
author_sort T J Hagenaars
title Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.
title_short Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.
title_full Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.
title_fullStr Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.
title_full_unstemmed Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.
title_sort risk of poultry compartments for transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
series PLoS ONE
issn 1932-6203
publishDate 2018-01-01
description When outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) occur in OIE member countries with until then disease-free status, member countries can use 'compartmentalisation'. A compartment may be defined as a subset of farms under a common management system, complying with certain stringent surveillance, control and biosecurity measures, and based on that may receive a disease-free status. Based on this disease-free status the compartment is exempted from certain transport restrictions coming into force in case of outbreaks occurring in the country. For deciding whether a candidate compartment is granted official compartment status, it is relevant to assess the additional HPAI transmission risks that would arise due to the exemptions granted. These risks consist of both additional local transmission risks as well as the additional risk of a 'jump' of HPAI infection from one poultry area, via the compartment, to another area. Here such risk assessment is carried out using a spatial mathematical model for between-farm transmission in the Netherlands, yielding insight in the roles of compartment composition and contact structure and identify relevant evaluation criteria for granting HPAI compartment status. At the core of this model are transmission probabilities associated with indirect between-farm contacts, e.g. through feed delivery, egg collection and professional visitors. These probabilities were estimated from Dutch epidemic outbreak data in earlier work. The additional risk of a jump of HPAI from one area, via the compartment, to another area is calculated relative to the direct jump risk. The results show that additional transmission risks caused by a compartment to other farms are mainly dependent on the distance of densely populated poultry areas (DPPAs) to the nearest compartment farm. Apart from conditions on these distances, we also recommend specific routing requirements for transport and other movements within the compartment.
url https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207076
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