Assets Expropriation via Cash Dividends? Free Cash Flow or Tunneling

This study solves the dispute between the free cash flow and tunneling hypotheses in explaining the role of cash dividends on asset expropriation of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. Investors value more the cash dividends and the cash holdings of firms with lower ownership contr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jeng-Ren Chiou, Yenn-Ru Chen, Ting-Chiao Huang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2010-06-01
Series:China Journal of Accounting Research
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1755309113600209
Description
Summary:This study solves the dispute between the free cash flow and tunneling hypotheses in explaining the role of cash dividends on asset expropriation of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. Investors value more the cash dividends and the cash holdings of firms with lower ownership control than those of firms with higher ownership control. This is more consistent with the tunneling hypothesis. However, when investment opportunities are considered, the free cash flow hypothesis better explains firms' dividend policy. Investors value more the cash dividends of firms with fewer investment opportunities and higher probability of expropriation. This study indicates that investors are concerned with the potential asset expropriation through cash payouts, unless firms possess high growth opportunities.
ISSN:1755-3091