| Summary: | The paper aims at defending Kantian ethics against the criticism of being “abstract”, “void”, and “without sentiment”. The criticism emerges from the fact that Kant grounds his ethics in a formal rather than a material principle. According to this criticism, Kant’s ethics would not relate to real human life. This paper, however, will not only consider the different faculties present in human reason, but also the way these faculties act upon moral motivation. In this motivation, the will is dynamically determined by reason in view of the realization of reason’s end, which is the achievement of virtue. This achievement of virtue generates, in turn, a vivid feeling in the soul: the feeling of respect each person has for humanity as an end in itself. The text argues that this is one of the ways by means of which Kant’s ethical proposal goes beyond the assumption of “void formalism”. It also acknowledges the roles of “vital force” and “commotion” in the achievement of the moral law.
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