Os conceitos de justo e injusto em Aristóteles: entre EN V,1 e EN V,9
Some authors of Jurisprudence, especially Michel Villey, tried to present what they thought to be the aristotelic theory of justice, grounding in it their own theories. To Villey, pecifically, “the right” would be the correct translation of the Greek to dikaion. To defend, based on Aristotle, a conc...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Portuguese |
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Universidade Federal do Paraná
2013-04-01
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| Series: | DoisPontos |
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| Online Access: | http://ojs.c3sl.ufpr.br/ojs/index.php/doispontos/article/view/32156/20918 |
| Summary: | Some authors of Jurisprudence, especially Michel Villey, tried to present what they thought to be the aristotelic theory of justice, grounding in it their own theories. To Villey, pecifically, “the right” would be the correct translation of the Greek to dikaion. To defend, based on Aristotle, a conception of the just that refuses subjective elements of a theory of action is an error. And this error lies in ignoring a redefinition of to dikaion made by Aristotle in Chapter 9 of Book V of Nicomachean Ethics. There, Aristotle adds to the objective conditions of the just and the unjust (EN V, 1-7) some subjective conditions referring to person who suffers the action. Only after correctly understanding these conditions we will be able to correctly understand the aristotelic theory of justice. As Villey and other authors ignore it, they err interpreting Aristotle and using him to found their own theories. |
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| ISSN: | 1807-3883 2179-7412 |