Policy resistance undermines superspreader vaccination strategies for influenza.

Theoretical models of infection spread on networks predict that targeting vaccination at individuals with a very large number of contacts (superspreaders) can reduce infection incidence by a significant margin. These models generally assume that superspreaders will always agree to be vaccinated. Hen...

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Main Authors: Chad R Wells, Eili Y Klein, Chris T Bauch
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2013-01-01
Series:PLoS Computational Biology
Online Access:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/23505357/?tool=EBI
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spelling doaj-51b85c6436e540b5abe4eab9cdb7647e2021-04-21T15:09:29ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS Computational Biology1553-734X1553-73582013-01-0193e100294510.1371/journal.pcbi.1002945Policy resistance undermines superspreader vaccination strategies for influenza.Chad R WellsEili Y KleinChris T BauchTheoretical models of infection spread on networks predict that targeting vaccination at individuals with a very large number of contacts (superspreaders) can reduce infection incidence by a significant margin. These models generally assume that superspreaders will always agree to be vaccinated. Hence, they cannot capture unintended consequences such as policy resistance, where the behavioral response induced by a new vaccine policy tends to reduce the expected benefits of the policy. Here, we couple a model of influenza transmission on an empirically-based contact network with a psychologically structured model of influenza vaccinating behavior, where individual vaccinating decisions depend on social learning and past experiences of perceived infections, vaccine complications and vaccine failures. We find that policy resistance almost completely undermines the effectiveness of superspreader strategies: the most commonly explored approaches that target a randomly chosen neighbor of an individual, or that preferentially choose neighbors with many contacts, provide at best a 2% relative improvement over their non-targeted counterpart as compared to 12% when behavioral feedbacks are ignored. Increased vaccine coverage in super spreaders is offset by decreased coverage in non-superspreaders, and superspreaders also have a higher rate of perceived vaccine failures on account of being infected more often. Including incentives for vaccination provides modest improvements in outcomes. We conclude that the design of influenza vaccine strategies involving widespread incentive use and/or targeting of superspreaders should account for policy resistance, and mitigate it whenever possible.https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/23505357/?tool=EBI
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Chad R Wells
Eili Y Klein
Chris T Bauch
spellingShingle Chad R Wells
Eili Y Klein
Chris T Bauch
Policy resistance undermines superspreader vaccination strategies for influenza.
PLoS Computational Biology
author_facet Chad R Wells
Eili Y Klein
Chris T Bauch
author_sort Chad R Wells
title Policy resistance undermines superspreader vaccination strategies for influenza.
title_short Policy resistance undermines superspreader vaccination strategies for influenza.
title_full Policy resistance undermines superspreader vaccination strategies for influenza.
title_fullStr Policy resistance undermines superspreader vaccination strategies for influenza.
title_full_unstemmed Policy resistance undermines superspreader vaccination strategies for influenza.
title_sort policy resistance undermines superspreader vaccination strategies for influenza.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
series PLoS Computational Biology
issn 1553-734X
1553-7358
publishDate 2013-01-01
description Theoretical models of infection spread on networks predict that targeting vaccination at individuals with a very large number of contacts (superspreaders) can reduce infection incidence by a significant margin. These models generally assume that superspreaders will always agree to be vaccinated. Hence, they cannot capture unintended consequences such as policy resistance, where the behavioral response induced by a new vaccine policy tends to reduce the expected benefits of the policy. Here, we couple a model of influenza transmission on an empirically-based contact network with a psychologically structured model of influenza vaccinating behavior, where individual vaccinating decisions depend on social learning and past experiences of perceived infections, vaccine complications and vaccine failures. We find that policy resistance almost completely undermines the effectiveness of superspreader strategies: the most commonly explored approaches that target a randomly chosen neighbor of an individual, or that preferentially choose neighbors with many contacts, provide at best a 2% relative improvement over their non-targeted counterpart as compared to 12% when behavioral feedbacks are ignored. Increased vaccine coverage in super spreaders is offset by decreased coverage in non-superspreaders, and superspreaders also have a higher rate of perceived vaccine failures on account of being infected more often. Including incentives for vaccination provides modest improvements in outcomes. We conclude that the design of influenza vaccine strategies involving widespread incentive use and/or targeting of superspreaders should account for policy resistance, and mitigate it whenever possible.
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/23505357/?tool=EBI
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