Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias for block ciphers
Abstract For block ciphers, Bogdanov et al. found that there are some linear approximations satisfying that their biases are deterministically invariant under key difference. This property is called key difference invariant bias. Based on this property, Bogdanov et al. proposed a related-key statist...
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Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1186/s42400-021-00096-4 |
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doaj-522e2d12898c4e8b857e741b342002d42021-10-03T11:20:21ZengSpringerOpenCybersecurity2523-32462021-10-014111810.1186/s42400-021-00096-4Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias for block ciphersWenqin Cao0Wentao Zhang1State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of SciencesState Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of SciencesAbstract For block ciphers, Bogdanov et al. found that there are some linear approximations satisfying that their biases are deterministically invariant under key difference. This property is called key difference invariant bias. Based on this property, Bogdanov et al. proposed a related-key statistical distinguisher and turned it into key-recovery attacks on LBlock and TWINE-128. In this paper, we propose a new related-key model by combining multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias. The main theoretical advantage is that our new model does not depend on statistical independence of linear approximations. We demonstrate our cryptanalysis technique by performing key recovery attacks on LBlock and TWINE-128. By using the relations of the involved round keys to reduce the number of guessed subkey bits. Moreover, the partial-compression technique is used to reduce the time complexity. We can recover the master key of LBlock up to 25 rounds with about 260.4 distinct known plaintexts, 278.85 time complexity and 261 bytes of memory requirements. Our attack can recover the master key of TWINE-128 up to 28 rounds with about 261.5 distinct known plaintexts, 2126.15 time complexity and 261 bytes of memory requirements. The results are the currently best ones on cryptanalysis of LBlock and TWINE-128.https://doi.org/10.1186/s42400-021-00096-4Key-alternating cipherKey difference invariant biasMultidimensional linear cryptanalysisLBlockTWINE |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Wenqin Cao Wentao Zhang |
spellingShingle |
Wenqin Cao Wentao Zhang Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias for block ciphers Cybersecurity Key-alternating cipher Key difference invariant bias Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis LBlock TWINE |
author_facet |
Wenqin Cao Wentao Zhang |
author_sort |
Wenqin Cao |
title |
Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias for block ciphers |
title_short |
Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias for block ciphers |
title_full |
Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias for block ciphers |
title_fullStr |
Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias for block ciphers |
title_full_unstemmed |
Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias for block ciphers |
title_sort |
multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias for block ciphers |
publisher |
SpringerOpen |
series |
Cybersecurity |
issn |
2523-3246 |
publishDate |
2021-10-01 |
description |
Abstract For block ciphers, Bogdanov et al. found that there are some linear approximations satisfying that their biases are deterministically invariant under key difference. This property is called key difference invariant bias. Based on this property, Bogdanov et al. proposed a related-key statistical distinguisher and turned it into key-recovery attacks on LBlock and TWINE-128. In this paper, we propose a new related-key model by combining multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias. The main theoretical advantage is that our new model does not depend on statistical independence of linear approximations. We demonstrate our cryptanalysis technique by performing key recovery attacks on LBlock and TWINE-128. By using the relations of the involved round keys to reduce the number of guessed subkey bits. Moreover, the partial-compression technique is used to reduce the time complexity. We can recover the master key of LBlock up to 25 rounds with about 260.4 distinct known plaintexts, 278.85 time complexity and 261 bytes of memory requirements. Our attack can recover the master key of TWINE-128 up to 28 rounds with about 261.5 distinct known plaintexts, 2126.15 time complexity and 261 bytes of memory requirements. The results are the currently best ones on cryptanalysis of LBlock and TWINE-128. |
topic |
Key-alternating cipher Key difference invariant bias Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis LBlock TWINE |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1186/s42400-021-00096-4 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT wenqincao multidimensionallinearcryptanalysiswithkeydifferenceinvariantbiasforblockciphers AT wentaozhang multidimensionallinearcryptanalysiswithkeydifferenceinvariantbiasforblockciphers |
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1716845496272683008 |