KONFLIK KEAGENAN: HUBUNGAN SIMULTAN KEPEMILIKAN MANAJERIAL, KEBIJAKAN UTANG, DAN KEBIJAKAN DIVIDEN

• Main Author: Fitri Susilowati
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Universitas Merdeka Malang 2017-03-01
• Series: Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan
• Subjects: agency conflict, dividend, leverage, managerial ownership, Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)
• Online Access: http://jurnal.unmer.ac.id/index.php/jkdp/article/view/833
• ISSN: 1410-8089; 2443-2687

The main purpose of this research was to determine the agency theory in Indonesia capital market. The variable<br />of agency conflict was represented by asset utility variable, while controlling the agency conflicts mechanism<br />was represented by the managerial ownership, leverage, and dividend. The secondary data used in this research<br />was drawn from the Indonesia Capital Market Directory (ICMD) and Blommberg. The sample data<br />were limited at the manufacture companies and non-financial services, and they were listed on the Indonesia<br />Stock Exchange (BEI). The research method approach used was quantitative method. The time period of the<br />data was year to year from 2000 to 2011. The instrument of analysis was seemingly unrelated regression<br />(SUR), with panel data and simultaneous model regression techniques. The result of this research was that the<br />managerial ownership had a positive and significant effect on performance. Debt policy had a positive effect<br />but not significant to performance, so 1b hypothesis was not accepted. Dividend policy had a positive and<br />significant effect on performance. Simultaneously there was a substitution and interdependence relationship<br />between the managerial ownership and debt policy. The relationship between two variables namely the managerial<br />ownership and dividend policy could not be concluded.