The Pricing Strategy of Dual Recycling Channels for Power Batteries of New Energy Vehicles under Government Subsidies

The vigorous development of the new energy automobile industry has highlighted the issue of efficient recycling of power batteries. Using a Stackelberg game, the pricing mechanism of dual-channel power battery recycling models under different government subsidies is investigated. Consequently, sensi...

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Main Authors: Xiaodong Zhu, Wei Li
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Hindawi-Wiley 2020-01-01
Series:Complexity
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/3691493
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spelling doaj-5504bef0e5d947f2bbfdb02cb2131aeb2020-11-25T03:08:46ZengHindawi-WileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262020-01-01202010.1155/2020/36914933691493The Pricing Strategy of Dual Recycling Channels for Power Batteries of New Energy Vehicles under Government SubsidiesXiaodong Zhu0Wei Li1School of Management Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, ChinaChang Wang School of Honors, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, ChinaThe vigorous development of the new energy automobile industry has highlighted the issue of efficient recycling of power batteries. Using a Stackelberg game, the pricing mechanism of dual-channel power battery recycling models under different government subsidies is investigated. Consequently, sensitivity analysis and comparison analysis are conducted, providing the pricing decision and the optimal profit of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) systems. Finally, the effects of recycling efforts, power battery greenness levels, service levels, and consumer green recycling awareness on prices of power batteries and profits are determined through numerical simulations, and the optimal prices under different strategies are compared. The results indicate that recycling prices of each party in the manufacturer subsidy model are relatively high, and consumers’ green awareness and the green levels of power batteries are directly proportional to the recycling prices offered by recycling parties. Automobile 4S stores and recycling networks should pay attention to the balance between the increase in the cost and the quantity of government subsidies for their recycling efforts. For recycling enterprises, maintaining an appropriate service level can maximize their profits and positively motivate the development of them.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/3691493
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Xiaodong Zhu
Wei Li
spellingShingle Xiaodong Zhu
Wei Li
The Pricing Strategy of Dual Recycling Channels for Power Batteries of New Energy Vehicles under Government Subsidies
Complexity
author_facet Xiaodong Zhu
Wei Li
author_sort Xiaodong Zhu
title The Pricing Strategy of Dual Recycling Channels for Power Batteries of New Energy Vehicles under Government Subsidies
title_short The Pricing Strategy of Dual Recycling Channels for Power Batteries of New Energy Vehicles under Government Subsidies
title_full The Pricing Strategy of Dual Recycling Channels for Power Batteries of New Energy Vehicles under Government Subsidies
title_fullStr The Pricing Strategy of Dual Recycling Channels for Power Batteries of New Energy Vehicles under Government Subsidies
title_full_unstemmed The Pricing Strategy of Dual Recycling Channels for Power Batteries of New Energy Vehicles under Government Subsidies
title_sort pricing strategy of dual recycling channels for power batteries of new energy vehicles under government subsidies
publisher Hindawi-Wiley
series Complexity
issn 1076-2787
1099-0526
publishDate 2020-01-01
description The vigorous development of the new energy automobile industry has highlighted the issue of efficient recycling of power batteries. Using a Stackelberg game, the pricing mechanism of dual-channel power battery recycling models under different government subsidies is investigated. Consequently, sensitivity analysis and comparison analysis are conducted, providing the pricing decision and the optimal profit of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) systems. Finally, the effects of recycling efforts, power battery greenness levels, service levels, and consumer green recycling awareness on prices of power batteries and profits are determined through numerical simulations, and the optimal prices under different strategies are compared. The results indicate that recycling prices of each party in the manufacturer subsidy model are relatively high, and consumers’ green awareness and the green levels of power batteries are directly proportional to the recycling prices offered by recycling parties. Automobile 4S stores and recycling networks should pay attention to the balance between the increase in the cost and the quantity of government subsidies for their recycling efforts. For recycling enterprises, maintaining an appropriate service level can maximize their profits and positively motivate the development of them.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/3691493
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