Stable Sampling Equilibrium in Common Pool Resource Games
This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of str...
Main Authors: | Juan Camilo Cárdenas, César Mantilla, Rajiv Sethi |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2015-08-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/3/299 |
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