Nevědomí jako dvojznačné vědomí. Merleau-Ponty o psychoanalýze (The Unconscious as Ambiguous Consciousness. Merleau-Ponty on Psychoanalysis)

• Main Author: Jan Puc
• Format: Article
• Language: ces
• Published: Ostium 2020-03-01
• Series: Ostium
• Subjects: the unconscious; psychoanalysis; body schema; bad faith
• Online Access: http://ostium.sk/language/sk/nevedomi-jako-dvojznacne-vedomi-merleau-ponty-o-psychoanalyze/

Merleau-Ponty’s attitude to psychoanalysis was ambiguous. On the one hand, he realized that the phenomena psychoanalysis deals with require to go beyond the area of ​​act intentionality, and that, from a different angle, psychoanalysis addresses the same problem as Gestalt psychology, which played the central role in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project. On the other hand, he explicitly rejected the terms used by Freud for conveying his discoveries. Merleau-Ponty replaced unconscious mental contents, which act on conscious behavior, by ambiguous consciousness. In the Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception, he used the terms “habit,” “bad faith,” “bodily expression,” “affective intentionality,” and “body schema” to specify his notion of experiential “ambiguity.” This paper aims to present the key concepts of Merleau-Ponty’s early interpretation of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious. A partial task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s concept of bad faith differs from that of Sartre, and to distinguish existential ambiguity from the psychoanalytic concept of overdetermination.