Reasoning through Crisis: Crisis, Incommensurability and Belief
This paper draws on Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, but it is neither an exposition nor a critique of that book and uses certain concepts from it as a springboard for reflections on the nature of crisis. Kuhn’s key term was paradigm; however, the primary focus of this paper wi...
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Centre de Recherche et d'Etudes en Civilisation Britannique
2016-09-01
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Online Access: | http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1069 |
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doaj-5f636c9e429147ff98010edc34c8e01d2020-11-24T23:11:36ZengCentre de Recherche et d'Etudes en Civilisation BritanniqueRevue Française de Civilisation Britannique0248-90152429-43732016-09-0121210.4000/rfcb.1069Reasoning through Crisis: Crisis, Incommensurability and BeliefJames ConnellyThis paper draws on Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, but it is neither an exposition nor a critique of that book and uses certain concepts from it as a springboard for reflections on the nature of crisis. Kuhn’s key term was paradigm; however, the primary focus of this paper will be on the intertwined concepts of normal and revolutionary science, and one of the concepts central to the latter: crisis. I ask whether crisis necessarily constitutes a break in continuity or practice, together with our understanding of that practice, thereby generating an inability to ‘think through’ crisis (the radical rupture thesis), or whether crisis can be conceived in an evolutionary fashion as a dialectical progression in which tensions and oppositions do not necessarily signify (or result in) a breakdown of the system or our understanding of it (the dialectical thesis). One of the underlying questions to be considered is precisely how far the analogy between natural science and politics is valid. Here my purpose is primarily to explore the issue and to raise questions rather than to provide concrete answers.http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1069KuhnCollingwoodcrisistraditionreasonnormal politics |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
James Connelly |
spellingShingle |
James Connelly Reasoning through Crisis: Crisis, Incommensurability and Belief Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique Kuhn Collingwood crisis tradition reason normal politics |
author_facet |
James Connelly |
author_sort |
James Connelly |
title |
Reasoning through Crisis: Crisis, Incommensurability and Belief |
title_short |
Reasoning through Crisis: Crisis, Incommensurability and Belief |
title_full |
Reasoning through Crisis: Crisis, Incommensurability and Belief |
title_fullStr |
Reasoning through Crisis: Crisis, Incommensurability and Belief |
title_full_unstemmed |
Reasoning through Crisis: Crisis, Incommensurability and Belief |
title_sort |
reasoning through crisis: crisis, incommensurability and belief |
publisher |
Centre de Recherche et d'Etudes en Civilisation Britannique |
series |
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique |
issn |
0248-9015 2429-4373 |
publishDate |
2016-09-01 |
description |
This paper draws on Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, but it is neither an exposition nor a critique of that book and uses certain concepts from it as a springboard for reflections on the nature of crisis. Kuhn’s key term was paradigm; however, the primary focus of this paper will be on the intertwined concepts of normal and revolutionary science, and one of the concepts central to the latter: crisis. I ask whether crisis necessarily constitutes a break in continuity or practice, together with our understanding of that practice, thereby generating an inability to ‘think through’ crisis (the radical rupture thesis), or whether crisis can be conceived in an evolutionary fashion as a dialectical progression in which tensions and oppositions do not necessarily signify (or result in) a breakdown of the system or our understanding of it (the dialectical thesis). One of the underlying questions to be considered is precisely how far the analogy between natural science and politics is valid. Here my purpose is primarily to explore the issue and to raise questions rather than to provide concrete answers. |
topic |
Kuhn Collingwood crisis tradition reason normal politics |
url |
http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1069 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT jamesconnelly reasoningthroughcrisiscrisisincommensurabilityandbelief |
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