An attack on disguised elliptic curves

We present an attack on one of the Hidden Pairing schemes proposed by Dent and Galbraith. We drastically reduce the number of variables necessary to perform a multivariate attack and in some cases we can completely recover the private key. Our attack relies only on knowledge of the public system par...

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Main Author: Morales David J. Mireles
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: De Gruyter 2008-04-01
Series:Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1515/JMC.2008.001
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spelling doaj-60657eb9366e4e4ba027070e4332dd762021-09-06T19:39:35ZengDe GruyterJournal of Mathematical Cryptology1862-29761862-29842008-04-01211810.1515/JMC.2008.001An attack on disguised elliptic curvesMorales David J. MirelesWe present an attack on one of the Hidden Pairing schemes proposed by Dent and Galbraith. We drastically reduce the number of variables necessary to perform a multivariate attack and in some cases we can completely recover the private key. Our attack relies only on knowledge of the public system parameters.https://doi.org/10.1515/JMC.2008.001public key cryptographycryptanalysiselliptic curvespairings
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Morales David J. Mireles
spellingShingle Morales David J. Mireles
An attack on disguised elliptic curves
Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
public key cryptography
cryptanalysis
elliptic curves
pairings
author_facet Morales David J. Mireles
author_sort Morales David J. Mireles
title An attack on disguised elliptic curves
title_short An attack on disguised elliptic curves
title_full An attack on disguised elliptic curves
title_fullStr An attack on disguised elliptic curves
title_full_unstemmed An attack on disguised elliptic curves
title_sort attack on disguised elliptic curves
publisher De Gruyter
series Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
issn 1862-2976
1862-2984
publishDate 2008-04-01
description We present an attack on one of the Hidden Pairing schemes proposed by Dent and Galbraith. We drastically reduce the number of variables necessary to perform a multivariate attack and in some cases we can completely recover the private key. Our attack relies only on knowledge of the public system parameters.
topic public key cryptography
cryptanalysis
elliptic curves
pairings
url https://doi.org/10.1515/JMC.2008.001
work_keys_str_mv AT moralesdavidjmireles anattackondisguisedellipticcurves
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