The Electoral Court and Political Parties’ Expenditures in Mexico
I analyze the main determinants of why the electoral tribunal upholds or overturns fines imposed by the ife to Mexico’s political parties, as revealed by audits of political spending. I found evidence that partially support the hypotheses developed by the judicial politics literature, which states t...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
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Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Sede México
2016-01-01
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| Series: | Perfiles Latinoamericanos |
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| Online Access: | http://perfilesla.flacso.edu.mx/index.php/perfilesla/article/view/627 |
| Summary: | I analyze the main determinants of why the electoral tribunal upholds or overturns fines imposed by the ife to Mexico’s political parties, as revealed by audits of political spending. I found evidence that partially support the hypotheses developed by the judicial politics literature, which states that specialized courts, such as the electoral tribunal are more likely to overturn decisions of a specialized agency for strategic reasons. By analyzing 1671 fines challenged between 1996 and 2010, I conclude that although magistrates affirm three out of four fines, they overturn ife’s decisions when there is a salient issue, such as campaign spending or when relevant political elites challenge the fines imposed. |
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| ISSN: | 0188-7653 2309-4982 |