Uniform price auction of divisible goods based on multiple rounds linear bidding and its equilibrium analysis
In this paper, the auction problem of a kind of continuous homogeneous divisible goods is studied and a uniform price auction mechanism is presented based on three conditions, i.e. the auctioneer’s supply is variable, every bidder submits multiple rounds continuous linear bidding, and every bidder’...
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Vilnius Gediminas Technical University
2015-01-01
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| Series: | Technological and Economic Development of Economy |
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| Online Access: | https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/TEDE/article/view/1045 |
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doaj-66798b275a594b71bcc5b370359352d12021-07-02T10:00:07ZengVilnius Gediminas Technical UniversityTechnological and Economic Development of Economy2029-49132029-49212015-01-0121110.3846/20294913.2013.876457Uniform price auction of divisible goods based on multiple rounds linear bidding and its equilibrium analysisCongjun Rao0Yong Zhao1Yang Chen2College of Mathematics and Computer Science, Huanggang Normal University, 438000 Huanggang, P. R. China; Institute of Systems Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 430074 Wuhan, P. R. China; School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 430074 Wuhan, P. R. ChinaInstitute of Systems Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 430074 Wuhan, P. R. ChinaInstitute of Systems Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 430074 Wuhan, P. R. China In this paper, the auction problem of a kind of continuous homogeneous divisible goods is studied and a uniform price auction mechanism is presented based on three conditions, i.e. the auctioneer’s supply is variable, every bidder submits multiple rounds continuous linear bidding, and every bidder’s valuation to per unit of the goods is independent private information. Concretely, two key problems, i.e. the bidders’ asymptotic strategic behaviours and forming process and composition of equilibrium points are explored. The conclusion is drawn that different bidders’ bidding order and different starting points of initial bidding would not cause different local equilibrium points, and if the equilibrium points exist, then the equilibrium point is unique. First published online: 09 Jun 2014 https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/TEDE/article/view/1045divisible goodsuniform price auctionlinear biddingequilibrium points |
| collection |
DOAJ |
| language |
English |
| format |
Article |
| sources |
DOAJ |
| author |
Congjun Rao Yong Zhao Yang Chen |
| spellingShingle |
Congjun Rao Yong Zhao Yang Chen Uniform price auction of divisible goods based on multiple rounds linear bidding and its equilibrium analysis Technological and Economic Development of Economy divisible goods uniform price auction linear bidding equilibrium points |
| author_facet |
Congjun Rao Yong Zhao Yang Chen |
| author_sort |
Congjun Rao |
| title |
Uniform price auction of divisible goods based on multiple rounds linear bidding and its equilibrium analysis |
| title_short |
Uniform price auction of divisible goods based on multiple rounds linear bidding and its equilibrium analysis |
| title_full |
Uniform price auction of divisible goods based on multiple rounds linear bidding and its equilibrium analysis |
| title_fullStr |
Uniform price auction of divisible goods based on multiple rounds linear bidding and its equilibrium analysis |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Uniform price auction of divisible goods based on multiple rounds linear bidding and its equilibrium analysis |
| title_sort |
uniform price auction of divisible goods based on multiple rounds linear bidding and its equilibrium analysis |
| publisher |
Vilnius Gediminas Technical University |
| series |
Technological and Economic Development of Economy |
| issn |
2029-4913 2029-4921 |
| publishDate |
2015-01-01 |
| description |
In this paper, the auction problem of a kind of continuous homogeneous divisible goods is studied and a uniform price auction mechanism is presented based on three conditions, i.e. the auctioneer’s supply is variable, every bidder submits multiple rounds continuous linear bidding, and every bidder’s valuation to per unit of the goods is independent private information. Concretely, two key problems, i.e. the bidders’ asymptotic strategic behaviours and forming process and composition of equilibrium points are explored. The conclusion is drawn that different bidders’ bidding order and different starting points of initial bidding would not cause different local equilibrium points, and if the equilibrium points exist, then the equilibrium point is unique.
First published online: 09 Jun 2014
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| topic |
divisible goods uniform price auction linear bidding equilibrium points |
| url |
https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/TEDE/article/view/1045 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT congjunrao uniformpriceauctionofdivisiblegoodsbasedonmultipleroundslinearbiddinganditsequilibriumanalysis AT yongzhao uniformpriceauctionofdivisiblegoodsbasedonmultipleroundslinearbiddinganditsequilibriumanalysis AT yangchen uniformpriceauctionofdivisiblegoodsbasedonmultipleroundslinearbiddinganditsequilibriumanalysis |
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1721332549377064960 |