Transcendental Self and the Feeling of Existence
In this essay, I investigate one aspect of Kant’s larger theory of the transcendental self. In the Prolegomena, Kant says that the transcendental self can be represented as a feeling of existence. In contrast to the view that Kant errs in describing the transcendental self in this fashion, I show th...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Con-textos Kantianos
2016-06-01
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| Series: | Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/131 |
| Summary: | In this essay, I investigate one aspect of Kant’s larger theory of the transcendental self. In the Prolegomena, Kant says that the transcendental self can be represented as a feeling of existence. In contrast to the view that Kant errs in describing the transcendental self in this fashion, I show that there exists a strand in Kant’s philosophy that permits us to interpret the representation of the transcendental self as a feeling of existence—as the obscurely conscious and temporally inaccessible modification of the state of the discursive subject, which is built into all the representations of such a subject. I also provide an account of how the transcendental self can be legitimately understood both as an epistemic condition for the possibility of experience as well as the representation of a non-naturalistic feeling of existence. |
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| ISSN: | 2386-7655 2386-7655 |