Systemic and Non-Systemic Corruption in Education: the Game Model

• Main Authors: Skrypnyk Andrii V., Oborska Inna S.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: PH "INZHEK" 2016-11-01
• Series: Problemi Ekonomiki
• Subjects: Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI); higher education; human and administrative capital; systemic and non-systemic corruption; bimatrix game; payoff matrix
• Online Access: http://www.problecon.com/export_pdf/problems-of-economy-2016-4_0-pages-273_278.pdf

The aim of the article is to analyze the existing practices of corruption in higher education and their impact on its quality index as well as develop recommendations on their overcoming. Game methods to analyze the corrupt interaction in the process of getting education are proposed. There identified two categories of lecturers taking bribes: professional bribe-takers and amateurs. It is emphasized that the existence of professionals is only possible under conditions of systemic corruption when part of the risk is passed on to the university administration. The activity of amateurs is analyzed using gaming technologies. The payoff matrices of the student and the teacher are built, the latter includes the likelihood of detection and possible punishment for corruption. It is shown that under current conditions there is saddle point when both the student and the teacher use illegal strategies. The transition to a mixed strategy is possible only in case of a significant increase in the probability of detecting acts of corruption on the part of the teacher or the increase of the size of punishment for corruption. Significant improvements are possible in the case when the population will change views on the effectiveness of knowledge as a source of human capital.