Categorical judgments do not modify sensory representations in working memory.

Categorical judgments can systematically bias the perceptual interpretation of stimulus features. However, it remained unclear whether categorical judgments directly modify working memory representations or, alternatively, generate these biases via an inference process down-stream from working memor...

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Main Authors: Long Luu, Alan A Stocker
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2021-06-01
Series:PLoS Computational Biology
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008968
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spelling doaj-74379e5d85a04c81a0cb8059881e82ab2021-06-24T04:30:54ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS Computational Biology1553-734X1553-73582021-06-01176e100896810.1371/journal.pcbi.1008968Categorical judgments do not modify sensory representations in working memory.Long LuuAlan A StockerCategorical judgments can systematically bias the perceptual interpretation of stimulus features. However, it remained unclear whether categorical judgments directly modify working memory representations or, alternatively, generate these biases via an inference process down-stream from working memory. To address this question we ran two novel psychophysical experiments in which human subjects had to reverse their categorical judgments about a stimulus feature, if incorrect, before providing an estimate of the feature. If categorical judgments indeed directly altered sensory representations in working memory, subjects' estimates should reflect some aspects of their initial (incorrect) categorical judgment in those trials. We found no traces of the initial categorical judgment. Rather, subjects seemed to be able to flexibly switch their categorical judgment if needed and use the correct corresponding categorical prior to properly perform feature inference. A cross-validated model comparison also revealed that feedback may lead to selective memory recall such that only memory samples that are consistent with the categorical judgment are accepted for the inference process. Our results suggest that categorical judgments do not modify sensory information in working memory but rather act as top-down expectations in the subsequent sensory recall and inference process.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008968
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Long Luu
Alan A Stocker
spellingShingle Long Luu
Alan A Stocker
Categorical judgments do not modify sensory representations in working memory.
PLoS Computational Biology
author_facet Long Luu
Alan A Stocker
author_sort Long Luu
title Categorical judgments do not modify sensory representations in working memory.
title_short Categorical judgments do not modify sensory representations in working memory.
title_full Categorical judgments do not modify sensory representations in working memory.
title_fullStr Categorical judgments do not modify sensory representations in working memory.
title_full_unstemmed Categorical judgments do not modify sensory representations in working memory.
title_sort categorical judgments do not modify sensory representations in working memory.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
series PLoS Computational Biology
issn 1553-734X
1553-7358
publishDate 2021-06-01
description Categorical judgments can systematically bias the perceptual interpretation of stimulus features. However, it remained unclear whether categorical judgments directly modify working memory representations or, alternatively, generate these biases via an inference process down-stream from working memory. To address this question we ran two novel psychophysical experiments in which human subjects had to reverse their categorical judgments about a stimulus feature, if incorrect, before providing an estimate of the feature. If categorical judgments indeed directly altered sensory representations in working memory, subjects' estimates should reflect some aspects of their initial (incorrect) categorical judgment in those trials. We found no traces of the initial categorical judgment. Rather, subjects seemed to be able to flexibly switch their categorical judgment if needed and use the correct corresponding categorical prior to properly perform feature inference. A cross-validated model comparison also revealed that feedback may lead to selective memory recall such that only memory samples that are consistent with the categorical judgment are accepted for the inference process. Our results suggest that categorical judgments do not modify sensory information in working memory but rather act as top-down expectations in the subsequent sensory recall and inference process.
url https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008968
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