Informed Principal Model and Contract in Supply Chain with Demand Disruption Asymmetric Information

Because of the frequency and disastrous influence, the supply chain disruption has caused extensive concern both in the industry and in the academia. In a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer, the demand of the retailer is uncertain and meanwhile may suffer disruption with a probabili...

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Main Authors: Huan Zhang, Jianli Jiang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Hindawi Limited 2016-01-01
Series:Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/2306583
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spelling doaj-7467c5bf0bd746c4ba7311190da884132020-11-24T23:58:51ZengHindawi LimitedMathematical Problems in Engineering1024-123X1563-51472016-01-01201610.1155/2016/23065832306583Informed Principal Model and Contract in Supply Chain with Demand Disruption Asymmetric InformationHuan Zhang0Jianli Jiang1Department of Economic Management, North China Electric Power University, Baoding, Hebei 071100, ChinaDepartment of Economic Management, North China Electric Power University, Baoding, Hebei 071100, ChinaBecause of the frequency and disastrous influence, the supply chain disruption has caused extensive concern both in the industry and in the academia. In a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer, the demand of the retailer is uncertain and meanwhile may suffer disruption with a probability. Taking the demand disruption probability as the retailer’s asymmetric information, an informed principal model with the retailer as the principal is explored to make the contract. The retailer can show its information to the manufacturer through the contract. It is found out that the high-risk retailer intends to pretend to be the low-risk one. So the separating contract is given through the low-information-intensity allocation, in which the order quantity and the transferring payment for the low-risk retailer distort upwards, but those of high-risk retailer do not distort. In order to reduce the signaling cost which the low-risk retailer pays, the interim efficient model is introduced, which ends up with the order quantity and transferring payment distorting upwards again but less than before. In the numerical examples, with two different mutation probabilities, the informed principal contracts show the application of the informed principal model in the supply chain with demand disruption.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/2306583
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Huan Zhang
Jianli Jiang
spellingShingle Huan Zhang
Jianli Jiang
Informed Principal Model and Contract in Supply Chain with Demand Disruption Asymmetric Information
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
author_facet Huan Zhang
Jianli Jiang
author_sort Huan Zhang
title Informed Principal Model and Contract in Supply Chain with Demand Disruption Asymmetric Information
title_short Informed Principal Model and Contract in Supply Chain with Demand Disruption Asymmetric Information
title_full Informed Principal Model and Contract in Supply Chain with Demand Disruption Asymmetric Information
title_fullStr Informed Principal Model and Contract in Supply Chain with Demand Disruption Asymmetric Information
title_full_unstemmed Informed Principal Model and Contract in Supply Chain with Demand Disruption Asymmetric Information
title_sort informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information
publisher Hindawi Limited
series Mathematical Problems in Engineering
issn 1024-123X
1563-5147
publishDate 2016-01-01
description Because of the frequency and disastrous influence, the supply chain disruption has caused extensive concern both in the industry and in the academia. In a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer, the demand of the retailer is uncertain and meanwhile may suffer disruption with a probability. Taking the demand disruption probability as the retailer’s asymmetric information, an informed principal model with the retailer as the principal is explored to make the contract. The retailer can show its information to the manufacturer through the contract. It is found out that the high-risk retailer intends to pretend to be the low-risk one. So the separating contract is given through the low-information-intensity allocation, in which the order quantity and the transferring payment for the low-risk retailer distort upwards, but those of high-risk retailer do not distort. In order to reduce the signaling cost which the low-risk retailer pays, the interim efficient model is introduced, which ends up with the order quantity and transferring payment distorting upwards again but less than before. In the numerical examples, with two different mutation probabilities, the informed principal contracts show the application of the informed principal model in the supply chain with demand disruption.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/2306583
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AT jianlijiang informedprincipalmodelandcontractinsupplychainwithdemanddisruptionasymmetricinformation
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