Optimal design of securitization in a principal-agent relationship based on Bayesian inference for moral hazard

In the securitization process, by selling the mortgage loans to risk-lover investors, originator can allocate the mortgage loans risk to them. In this case, originator may not have an incentive to screen out borrowers, resulting in the moral hazard problem. This paper, within a principal-agent frame...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ezatollah Abbasian, Mohsen Ebrahimi, Elham Farzanegan
Format: Article
Language:fas
Published: University of Tehran 2015-03-01
Series:تحقیقات مالی
Subjects:
Online Access:https://jfr.ut.ac.ir/article_50708_d74f10f8eb9b81e5c7b0c1ffc555a436.pdf

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