Managerial Stock Compensation and Risky Investment
This study analyzes the relationship between the mix of CEO equity-based compensation, namely stock options and restricted stock, and firms’ risky investment. In general, the theory suggests that long-term compensation aligns CEOs’ and shareholders’ interests by inducing the managers to undertake ri...
Main Author: | Raluca Georgiana Nastasescu |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
General Association of Economists from Romania
2009-06-01
|
Series: | Theoretical and Applied Economics |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: |
http://store.ectap.ro/articole/391.pdf
|
Similar Items
-
Managerial Stock Compensation and Risky Investment
by: Raluca Georgiana Nastasescu
Published: (2009-06-01) -
Compensation Choice - The Effect on Firm Performance: An Interindustry Look at Performance Plans and Restricted Stock
by: Lobingier, Patricia Graybeal
Published: (2014) -
The impact of CEO option grants on firm value: determinants of the effectiveness of option grants
by: Weber, Catherine Krueger
Published: (2007) -
Executive Compensation and Firm Performance in New Zealand: The Role of Employee Stock Option Plans
by: David K. Ding, et al.
Published: (2021-01-01) -
The Predictive Power of CEO Equity Incentive Compensation on the Enforcement of an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release
by: Houy, Alexander
Published: (2019)