Assaying J. L. Mackie\\\'s View on Evil Based on Suhrewardi\\\'s Philosophy

• Main Authors: S.Moreza Hosseini Shahroudi, Reyhaneh Shayesteh
• Format: Article
• Language: fas
• Published: University of Isfahan 2014-01-01
• Series: Comparative Theology
• Subjects: evil; good; Powerful without qualification; Omnibenevolence; J. L. Mackie; Suhrawardi
• Online Access: http://uijs.ui.ac.ir/coth/browse.php?a_code=A-10-325-1&slc_lang=en&sid=1

J. L. Mackie is among those philosophers who have highlighted evil as evidence to God's nonexistence. Suhrewardi's ideas of evil can partially answer some of his critiques. There are two kinds of answers to Mackie's objections in Suhrewardi's ideas: 1- direct answers, 2- answers which can be inferred from the general principles of Suhrewardi's philosophy. Of course some of Mackie's critiques cannot be retorted upon Suhrewardi's philosophy.   J. L. Mackie lays out his major objection through the argument that God is omnipotent, he is purely good, evil exists; the latter proposition shall contradict the former two ones if they are true. Following this argument Mackie levels other minor objections too.   The major objection of Mackie can be retorted by basic principles of Suhrewardi's philosophy: human lack of authority in attribution of good and evil a principle which if adopted by one it eventually leads to partial evil's disappearance in universal goodness; acceptance of the rule: "the higher is not concerned with the lower" which disqualifies man of negation of absolute divine attributes after the demonstration of Necessary Being; rational determination of taxonomy of contingent beings according to the good/evil order the result of which is demonstration of pure goodness of God and minor evil's not being in contradiction with pure goodness attribute; acceptance of the maxim that evils are necessary for higher goods which not only makes evils' existence not to challenge divine power and goodness but rather it is indeed the lack of evil that would challenge wisdom.    Having outlined his major critique, Mackie reviews some of the answers offered by the theosophers and then takes them all to task.   The first contradictory solution discussed by Mackie reads "good cannot exist without evil, or stated otherwise, evil is necessarily associated with good". Mackie levels some critiques against this solution. Among others one of these critiques is that if we presume that God cannot create a good unless he simultaneously creates an evil along with it this shall restrict divine power and this in turn implies either God is not omnipotent or there are some limitations to what an Omnipotent does.   According to Suhrewardi, God can be omnipotent while his power does not fall to logical impossibilities and thus divine omnipotence which is one of the constitutive hypotheses remains intact without having been refuted through the argument.   Mackie's second objection to the first solution is that the public believes in evil/good dichotomy but the proposed solution denies its reality. If evil is essentially associated with good the benevolent person requires not to uproot evil plus the fact that evil and goodness are no longer the essential attributes of reality.   In Suhrewardi's view, someone who considers darkness and evil as existential realities believes that these stand in opposition to light and goodness and if someone believes in this opposition and also holds that "from the one nothing emits but one" the s/he has to accept that the source of good and light is other than the source of darkness and evil. Suhrewardi believes that darkness and evil are no more than the absence of light and goodness and thus evil versus good and darkness versus light represent privation/possession relationship. Accordingly, Suhrewardi refutes the idea that good and evil are correlatives. The one who believes in the correlation of evil and good, moreover, is not exposed to the objection "that then evil and good could not be the essential attributes of facts".   The second solution Mackie discusses on the behalf of theosophers is that evil is necessary through good. Mackie believes that this solution casts serious doubts on divine omnipotence as according to the law of causality, without a determinate mediation one cannot reach a specific goal and if God is compelled to create evil as a mediator for good he has to be exposed to at least to some causal rules and this is in sheer contrast with God's omnipotence and falsifies one of the constitutive proposition, i.e. "God is omnipotent".    Suhrewardi rejects this objection and believes that creatures are of three types: some have been created without mediation; some others have been created via mediation. He offers some arguments as to the latter type and thus demonstrates that some acts are being issued from God via mediation.   The third solution which is dealt with by Mackie in his essay as a contradictory solution is that "the world with evils is better than a world without evils". By pursuing the implications of this solution after Mackie, we come to the conclusion that Suhrewardi does not have any answer to Mackie's objections.The fourth solution, Mackie argues, is the best defense available of theists' ideas. This solution is known as "argument from free will" and reads: evil is a requirement of free will. Thus conceived, evil does not have anything to do with God and is a purely human reality whose responsibility falls on human being not on God.    Mackie believes that God could create man in a form that he would always choose good over evil. If it is not logically impossible for human individuals to choose goodness for a number of times it is not also impossible to suppose that man could willingly choose good forever. According to Suherwardi, as it is logically impossible to imagine a material world without evil it is also logically impossible to think that man being a creature with a free will can invariably act after goodness.