The Sure-Thing Principle
In 1954, Jim Savage introduced the Sure Thing Principle to demonstrate that preferences among actions could constitute an axiomatic basis for a Bayesian foundation of statistical inference. Here, we trace the history of the principle, discuss some of its nuances, and evaluate its significance in the...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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De Gruyter
2016-03-01
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| Series: | Journal of Causal Inference |
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/jci-2016-0005 |
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doaj-7d36f6d21afa49faadfd4c2340ad08ab2021-09-06T19:40:28ZengDe GruyterJournal of Causal Inference2193-36772193-36852016-03-0141818610.1515/jci-2016-0005The Sure-Thing PrinciplePearl Judea0Computer Science Department, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, 90095–1596, USAIn 1954, Jim Savage introduced the Sure Thing Principle to demonstrate that preferences among actions could constitute an axiomatic basis for a Bayesian foundation of statistical inference. Here, we trace the history of the principle, discuss some of its nuances, and evaluate its significance in the light of modern understanding of causal reasoning.https://doi.org/10.1515/jci-2016-0005jcijudea pearlucla |
| collection |
DOAJ |
| language |
English |
| format |
Article |
| sources |
DOAJ |
| author |
Pearl Judea |
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Pearl Judea The Sure-Thing Principle Journal of Causal Inference jci judea pearl ucla |
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Pearl Judea |
| author_sort |
Pearl Judea |
| title |
The Sure-Thing Principle |
| title_short |
The Sure-Thing Principle |
| title_full |
The Sure-Thing Principle |
| title_fullStr |
The Sure-Thing Principle |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Sure-Thing Principle |
| title_sort |
sure-thing principle |
| publisher |
De Gruyter |
| series |
Journal of Causal Inference |
| issn |
2193-3677 2193-3685 |
| publishDate |
2016-03-01 |
| description |
In 1954, Jim Savage introduced the Sure Thing Principle to demonstrate that preferences among actions could constitute an axiomatic basis for a Bayesian foundation of statistical inference. Here, we trace the history of the principle, discuss some of its nuances, and evaluate its significance in the light of modern understanding of causal reasoning. |
| topic |
jci judea pearl ucla |
| url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/jci-2016-0005 |
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