Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain
This study establishs a dual channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model under a government–penalty mechanism (RPM) consisting a dual-channel manufacturer, a retailer, and the government. We consider a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the government rewards or punish...
Main Authors: | Haitao Chen, Zhaohui Dong, Gendao Li |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2020-10-01
|
Series: | Sustainability |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/20/8602 |
Similar Items
-
A Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competitive Dual Collection Channel under Asymmetric Information and Reward–Penalty Mechanism
by: Wenbin Wang, et al.
Published: (2018-06-01) -
Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism
by: Quanxi Li, et al.
Published: (2021-06-01) -
Optimal pricing and offering reward decisions in a competitive closed-loop dual-channel supply chain with recycling and remanufacturing
by: Pal, B.
Published: (2022) -
Retail Services and Pricing Decisions in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Remanufacturing
by: Zhen-Zheng Zhang, et al.
Published: (2015-02-01) -
Collection and Coordination Strategies in a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Manufacturer Diseconomies of Scale
by: Li-Ping Song, et al.
Published: (2021-01-01)