Epistemic Commitment in Structuralist Approach of Theories
The idea that the Structuralist Program is completely neutral in epistemological matters is widely extended. On the contrary, the article’s purpose is to show that while it is true that structuralism is neutral in the epistemological debate between realism and antirealism, structuralism supposes an...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
Published: |
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
2012-06-01
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Series: | Revista de Filosofia |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/39294 |
Summary: | The idea that the Structuralist Program is completely neutral in epistemological matters is widely extended. On the contrary, the article’s purpose is to show that while it is true that structuralism is neutral in the epistemological debate between realism and antirealism, structuralism supposes an epistemic commitment in thefoundation of theories. This epistemic commitment has the characteristics of a <em>coherentism </em>and two structuralist thesis lead precisely to that: scientific theories are contrasted through its intended applications and the intended applications of a theoryare described only in non- theoretical concepts relative to theory. |
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ISSN: | 0034-8244 1988-284X |