| Summary: | We used psychological
methods to investigate how two prominent interventions, participatory decision
making and enforcement, influence voluntary cooperation in a common-pool
resource dilemma. Groups (N=40) harvested resources from a shared resource
pool. Individuals in the Voted-Enforce condition voted on conservation rules
and could use economic sanctions to enforce them. In other conditions,
individuals could not vote (Imposed-Enforce condition), lacked enforcement
(Voted condition), or both (Imposed condition). Cooperation was strongest in
the Voted-Enforce condition (Phase 2). Moreover, these groups continued to
cooperate voluntarily after enforcement was removed later in the experiment.
Cooperation was weakest in the Imposed-Enforce condition and degraded after
enforcement ceased. Thus, enforcement improved voluntary cooperation only when
individuals voted. Perceptions of procedural justice, self-determination, and
security were highest in the Voted-Enforced condition. These factors
(legitimacy, security) increased voluntary cooperation by promoting rule
acceptance and internalized motivation. Voted-Enforce participants also felt
closer to one another (i.e., self-other merging), further contributing to their
cooperation. Neither voting nor enforcement produced these sustained
psychological conditions alone. Voting lacked security without enforcement
(Voted condition), so the individuals who disliked the rule (i.e., the losing
voters) pillaged the resource. Enforcement lacked legitimacy without voting
(Imposed-Enforce condition), so it crowded out internal reasons for
cooperation. Governance interventions should carefully promote security without
stifling fundamental needs (e.g., procedural justice) or undermining internal
motives for cooperation.
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