James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on the Weaknesses of Majority Voting: A Triptych

• Main Author: Julien Grandjean
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Association Œconomia 2021-03-01
• Series: Œconomia
• Subjects: Buchanan (James); Tullock (Gordon); public choice; majority voting; logrolling; unanimity
• Online Access: http://journals.openedition.org/oeconomia/10780

This paper provides a narrative of the different but complementary accounts of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on the weaknesses of simple majority voting. The paper shows that these authors took different paths to reach the same conclusion. Buchanan used his knowledge about Knut Wicksell which he applied to an abstract framework. Tullock was inspired by his reading of Duncan Black and Anthony Downs and between 1959 and 1961 in particular, produced numerous published and unpublished works which formed the basis of his contribution to The Calculus of Consent. This book which was jointly authored by Tullock and Buchanan proposes a theoretical reflection on majority voting. The present paper examines Buchanan and Tullock’s critique of majority voting and highlights the radical but overlooked contribution made by Tullock to the book and to the development of the Virginia public choice research program.