The Rights of theWronged: Norms of Nuclearism, the Polygon and the Making of Waste-life

• Main Author: Aliya Sartbayeva Peleo
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: National Sun Yat-sen University 2017-05-01
• Series: Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal
• Subjects: nuclearism; Cold War geopolitics; biopolitics of wasted lives; Semipalatinsk polygon; China’s rise
• Online Access: http://rpb115.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2374/CCPS3(1)-Peleo.pdf

On 16th December 1991 Kazakhstan inherited “1216 nuclear warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles and heavy bombers” (Werner and Purvis-Roberts, 2006). Moreover, Kazakhstan was also presumed to have significant amounts of enriched weapon-grade uranium enough for at least “two dozen warheads” (ibid.). However on 23rd May 1992 Kazakhstan signed the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), gave up its “nuclear ambitions” and agreed “to become a non-nuclear weapon state” (Ayazbekov, 2014). Why did Kazakhstan give up nuclear weapons? This can be adequately answered only by linking the issue with the high material, human and environmental costs of hosting WMDs within the state territory. This paper examines the case of ‘waste-lives’ (Bauman, 2004) related to the Semipalatinsk Polygon in Kazakhstan. The Polygon experienced 467 nuclear tests during the period of 1949-1989 “without regard for the health and safety of those living and working near the test site” (Loretz, 2015). The issues of “human” exclusion of the periphery of the Cold War IR and its effects after the end of the Cold War are at the core of this case study. The structure of the international system (Waltz, 1 979) and “nuclear deterrence” (Brodie, 1 958) that explain “Long Peace” during the Cold War came at the cost of well-being of the population that supposed to benefit out of the absence of warfare. Geopolitical perspective of the Cold War views historical events as anonymous or mechanical, except those that involved prominent leaders and disregards the “human” aspects of military industrial complex, particularly its biopolitical impact on the life-system of population. The fall of the USSR and “triumph of liberalism” helped to politicise and recognise the long-term effects of radiation contamination. However, this revelation did not resolve the issues as persistent problems being framed as a legacy of the “communist” Soviet Union that people have to accept; that is, without “institutional” or “individual” accountability, relocation, appropriate compensation and clearing the sites from contamination. What are the implications of this case for the future of “nuclearism” debate now with China’s rise in the region?