Capacity Allocation and Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances: A Combinatorial Auction-Based Modeling
This paper attempts to establish a framework to help airline alliances effectively allocate their seat capacity with the purpose of maximizing alliances’ revenue. By assuming the airline alliance as the auctioneer and seat capacity in an itinerary as lots, the combinatorial auction model is construc...
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Series: | Mathematical Problems in Engineering |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/3178650 |
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doaj-948ae8bb8f934b19957bb94285c1ce5a2020-11-24T23:08:41ZengHindawi LimitedMathematical Problems in Engineering1024-123X1563-51472017-01-01201710.1155/2017/31786503178650Capacity Allocation and Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances: A Combinatorial Auction-Based ModelingYing-jing Gu0Jin-Fu Zhu1Department of Air Transportation, Faculty of Civil Aviation, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, ChinaDepartment of Air Transportation, Faculty of Civil Aviation, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, ChinaThis paper attempts to establish a framework to help airline alliances effectively allocate their seat capacity with the purpose of maximizing alliances’ revenue. By assuming the airline alliance as the auctioneer and seat capacity in an itinerary as lots, the combinatorial auction model is constructed to optimize the allocation of the seat, and the revenue sharing method is established to share revenue between partners by Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. The result of the numerical study shows that the seat capacity allocation is effective even without information exchanging completely and the twofold revenue shares method shows more excitation for the airlines.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/3178650 |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Ying-jing Gu Jin-Fu Zhu |
spellingShingle |
Ying-jing Gu Jin-Fu Zhu Capacity Allocation and Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances: A Combinatorial Auction-Based Modeling Mathematical Problems in Engineering |
author_facet |
Ying-jing Gu Jin-Fu Zhu |
author_sort |
Ying-jing Gu |
title |
Capacity Allocation and Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances: A Combinatorial Auction-Based Modeling |
title_short |
Capacity Allocation and Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances: A Combinatorial Auction-Based Modeling |
title_full |
Capacity Allocation and Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances: A Combinatorial Auction-Based Modeling |
title_fullStr |
Capacity Allocation and Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances: A Combinatorial Auction-Based Modeling |
title_full_unstemmed |
Capacity Allocation and Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances: A Combinatorial Auction-Based Modeling |
title_sort |
capacity allocation and revenue sharing in airline alliances: a combinatorial auction-based modeling |
publisher |
Hindawi Limited |
series |
Mathematical Problems in Engineering |
issn |
1024-123X 1563-5147 |
publishDate |
2017-01-01 |
description |
This paper attempts to establish a framework to help airline alliances effectively allocate their seat capacity with the purpose of maximizing alliances’ revenue. By assuming the airline alliance as the auctioneer and seat capacity in an itinerary as lots, the combinatorial auction model is constructed to optimize the allocation of the seat, and the revenue sharing method is established to share revenue between partners by Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. The result of the numerical study shows that the seat capacity allocation is effective even without information exchanging completely and the twofold revenue shares method shows more excitation for the airlines. |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/3178650 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT yingjinggu capacityallocationandrevenuesharinginairlinealliancesacombinatorialauctionbasedmodeling AT jinfuzhu capacityallocationandrevenuesharinginairlinealliancesacombinatorialauctionbasedmodeling |
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1725612884005748736 |