Analogy, Explanation, and Proof

• Main Authors: John eHummel, John eLicato, Selmer eBringsjord
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Frontiers Media S.A. 2014-11-01
• Series: Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
• Subjects: modeling; logic; analogy; explanation; LISA
• Online Access: http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00867/full

People are habitual explanation generators. At its most mundane, our propensity to explain allows us to infer that we should not drink milk that smells sour; at the other extreme, it allows us to establish facts (e.g., theorems in mathematical logic) whose truth was not even known prior to the existence of the explanation (proof). What do the cognitive operations underlying the (inductive) inference that the milk is sour have in common with the (deductive) proof that, say, the square root of two is irrational? Our ability to generate explanations bears striking similarities to our ability to make analogies. Both reflect a capacity to generate inferences and generalizations that go beyond the featural similarities between a novel problem and familiar problems in terms of which the novel problem may be understood. However, a notable difference between analogy-making and explanation-generation is that the former is a process in which a single source situation is used to reason about a single target, whereas the latter often requires the reasoner to integrate multiple sources of knowledge. This small-seeming difference poses a challenge to the task of marshaling our understanding of analogical reasoning in the service of understanding explanation. We describe a model of explanation, derived from a model of analogy, adapted to permit systematic violations of this one-to-one mapping constraint. Simulation results demonstrate that the resulting model can generate explanations for novel explananda and that, like the explanations generated by human reasoners, these explanations vary in their coherence.