EL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL, ¿"SEMPRE, NOMÉS... I INDISCUTIBLE"? LA FUNCIÓ CONSTITUCIONAL DELS ESTATUTS EN L'ÀMBIT DE LA DISTRIBUCIÓ DE COMPETÈNCIES SEGONS LA STC 31/2010

• Main Author: Carles Viver Pi-Sunyer
• Format: Article
• Language: Catalan
• Published: Institut d'Estudis de l'Autogovern 2011-03-01
• Series: Revista d'Estudis Autonòmics i Federals
• Subjects: Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia; powers; effects of constitutional rulings; powers’ warrant; constitutional function of the statutes of autonomy
• Online Access: http://www10.gencat.cat/drep/binaris/_reaf12_Viver_tcm112-146946.pdf

This article analyses the effects that Spain’s Constitutional Court’s Ruling(hereafter referred to as the CCR) has had upon the constitutional functionof the 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (SAC) – and of the statutes ofautonomy in general – regarding the allocation of powers. Its main argumentis that the CCR, departing from its own previous case-law, has revokedall novelties introduced by the SAC; has altered the up to then prevailingconception about the legal nature of the statutes of autonomy; has judicially ignored the fact that the statutes of autonomy, after all bills of theSpanish Parliament, are based on an agreement between the autonomouscommunityand Spain’s institutions. Thus, the article highlights that the CCRhas seriously undermined the constitutional function that the statutes ofautonomy have in the distribution of powers between the autonomouscommunities and Spain’s institutions. The article points out that this is becausethe CCR has replaced the statutes’ constitutional role in the matterwith that of the Constitutional Court and, in practice, of Spain’s central institutions.The article concludes that the CCR refl ects that political and notlegal arguments have prevailed in regulating the distribution of powers,although, paradoxically, the changes the CCR has introduced in the way ofunderstanding the statutes’ constitutional function, have not implied anysubstantial change in the daily working of the so-called State of Autonomy.The article bases its conclusions on the analysis of the rationes decidendi ofthe CCR. Besides pointing out to the fact that the strict formalism of theCCR’s legal arguments is, by far, completely unusual from a comparative constitutionallaw perspective, the article claims that the CCR’s arguments aretoo simplistic since its premises do not necessarily lead to the conclusions itaims to draw. In addition, the article argues that the CCR shows manifestdefi ciencies in its construction, providing some examples.