Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher
The new block cipher PRINTcipher was introduced in CHES 2010 as a lightweight block cipher for ‘integrated circuit’ or IC‐‘printing’ technology. The key of PRINTcipher consist of two sub‐key components where the first sub‐key is ‘XORed’ to the state in each round, whereas the second sub‐key is used...
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doaj-a26e52787bcd4b8a983f6e6827113c552021-09-08T18:13:11ZengWileyIET Networks2047-49542047-49622013-03-0121303610.1049/iet-net.2012.0117Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipherNasour Bagheri0Reza Ebrahimpour1Navid Ghaedi2Electrical Engineering DepartmentShahid Rajaee Teacher Training UniversityTehranIranElectrical Engineering DepartmentShahid Rajaee Teacher Training UniversityTehranIranElectrical Engineering DepartmentShahid Rajaee Teacher Training UniversityTehranIranThe new block cipher PRINTcipher was introduced in CHES 2010 as a lightweight block cipher for ‘integrated circuit’ or IC‐‘printing’ technology. The key of PRINTcipher consist of two sub‐key components where the first sub‐key is ‘XORed’ to the state in each round, whereas the second sub‐key is used to generate the key‐dependent permutations. In this study, the authors describe a new differential fault analysis on the lightweight block cipher PRINTcipher. The authors present two different fault models for obtaining each sub‐key. The first fault model is used to obtain the second sub‐key, which induces a fault on the key‐dependent permutation layer so, on average, key search space is reduced from 232 to 214, given 36 faulty cipher texts. To obtain the first sub‐key, the authors induce a fault on an intermediate results then they obtain, on average, 42 bits of the first sub‐key with less than 24 faulty cipher texts. In total, on average, they reduce key search space of PRINTcipher from 280 to 220, given 60 faulty cipher texts. They also simulated their attack on a 1.8 GHz Celeron PC.https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-net.2012.0117differential fault analysisCHES 2010lightweight block cipherintegrated circuitIC‐printing technologyPRINTCIPHER key |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Nasour Bagheri Reza Ebrahimpour Navid Ghaedi |
spellingShingle |
Nasour Bagheri Reza Ebrahimpour Navid Ghaedi Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher IET Networks differential fault analysis CHES 2010 lightweight block cipher integrated circuit IC‐printing technology PRINTCIPHER key |
author_facet |
Nasour Bagheri Reza Ebrahimpour Navid Ghaedi |
author_sort |
Nasour Bagheri |
title |
Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher |
title_short |
Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher |
title_full |
Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher |
title_fullStr |
Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher |
title_full_unstemmed |
Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher |
title_sort |
differential fault analysis on printcipher |
publisher |
Wiley |
series |
IET Networks |
issn |
2047-4954 2047-4962 |
publishDate |
2013-03-01 |
description |
The new block cipher PRINTcipher was introduced in CHES 2010 as a lightweight block cipher for ‘integrated circuit’ or IC‐‘printing’ technology. The key of PRINTcipher consist of two sub‐key components where the first sub‐key is ‘XORed’ to the state in each round, whereas the second sub‐key is used to generate the key‐dependent permutations. In this study, the authors describe a new differential fault analysis on the lightweight block cipher PRINTcipher. The authors present two different fault models for obtaining each sub‐key. The first fault model is used to obtain the second sub‐key, which induces a fault on the key‐dependent permutation layer so, on average, key search space is reduced from 232 to 214, given 36 faulty cipher texts. To obtain the first sub‐key, the authors induce a fault on an intermediate results then they obtain, on average, 42 bits of the first sub‐key with less than 24 faulty cipher texts. In total, on average, they reduce key search space of PRINTcipher from 280 to 220, given 60 faulty cipher texts. They also simulated their attack on a 1.8 GHz Celeron PC. |
topic |
differential fault analysis CHES 2010 lightweight block cipher integrated circuit IC‐printing technology PRINTCIPHER key |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-net.2012.0117 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT nasourbagheri differentialfaultanalysisonprintcipher AT rezaebrahimpour differentialfaultanalysisonprintcipher AT navidghaedi differentialfaultanalysisonprintcipher |
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1717761964161105920 |