Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher

The new block cipher PRINTcipher was introduced in CHES 2010 as a lightweight block cipher for ‘integrated circuit’ or IC‐‘printing’ technology. The key of PRINTcipher consist of two sub‐key components where the first sub‐key is ‘XORed’ to the state in each round, whereas the second sub‐key is used...

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Main Authors: Nasour Bagheri, Reza Ebrahimpour, Navid Ghaedi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2013-03-01
Series:IET Networks
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-net.2012.0117
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spelling doaj-a26e52787bcd4b8a983f6e6827113c552021-09-08T18:13:11ZengWileyIET Networks2047-49542047-49622013-03-0121303610.1049/iet-net.2012.0117Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipherNasour Bagheri0Reza Ebrahimpour1Navid Ghaedi2Electrical Engineering DepartmentShahid Rajaee Teacher Training UniversityTehranIranElectrical Engineering DepartmentShahid Rajaee Teacher Training UniversityTehranIranElectrical Engineering DepartmentShahid Rajaee Teacher Training UniversityTehranIranThe new block cipher PRINTcipher was introduced in CHES 2010 as a lightweight block cipher for ‘integrated circuit’ or IC‐‘printing’ technology. The key of PRINTcipher consist of two sub‐key components where the first sub‐key is ‘XORed’ to the state in each round, whereas the second sub‐key is used to generate the key‐dependent permutations. In this study, the authors describe a new differential fault analysis on the lightweight block cipher PRINTcipher. The authors present two different fault models for obtaining each sub‐key. The first fault model is used to obtain the second sub‐key, which induces a fault on the key‐dependent permutation layer so, on average, key search space is reduced from 232 to 214, given 36 faulty cipher texts. To obtain the first sub‐key, the authors induce a fault on an intermediate results then they obtain, on average, 42 bits of the first sub‐key with less than 24 faulty cipher texts. In total, on average, they reduce key search space of PRINTcipher from 280 to 220, given 60 faulty cipher texts. They also simulated their attack on a 1.8 GHz Celeron PC.https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-net.2012.0117differential fault analysisCHES 2010lightweight block cipherintegrated circuitIC‐printing technologyPRINTCIPHER key
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Nasour Bagheri
Reza Ebrahimpour
Navid Ghaedi
spellingShingle Nasour Bagheri
Reza Ebrahimpour
Navid Ghaedi
Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher
IET Networks
differential fault analysis
CHES 2010
lightweight block cipher
integrated circuit
IC‐printing technology
PRINTCIPHER key
author_facet Nasour Bagheri
Reza Ebrahimpour
Navid Ghaedi
author_sort Nasour Bagheri
title Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher
title_short Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher
title_full Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher
title_fullStr Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher
title_full_unstemmed Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher
title_sort differential fault analysis on printcipher
publisher Wiley
series IET Networks
issn 2047-4954
2047-4962
publishDate 2013-03-01
description The new block cipher PRINTcipher was introduced in CHES 2010 as a lightweight block cipher for ‘integrated circuit’ or IC‐‘printing’ technology. The key of PRINTcipher consist of two sub‐key components where the first sub‐key is ‘XORed’ to the state in each round, whereas the second sub‐key is used to generate the key‐dependent permutations. In this study, the authors describe a new differential fault analysis on the lightweight block cipher PRINTcipher. The authors present two different fault models for obtaining each sub‐key. The first fault model is used to obtain the second sub‐key, which induces a fault on the key‐dependent permutation layer so, on average, key search space is reduced from 232 to 214, given 36 faulty cipher texts. To obtain the first sub‐key, the authors induce a fault on an intermediate results then they obtain, on average, 42 bits of the first sub‐key with less than 24 faulty cipher texts. In total, on average, they reduce key search space of PRINTcipher from 280 to 220, given 60 faulty cipher texts. They also simulated their attack on a 1.8 GHz Celeron PC.
topic differential fault analysis
CHES 2010
lightweight block cipher
integrated circuit
IC‐printing technology
PRINTCIPHER key
url https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-net.2012.0117
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