Scientific Representation and Realism
After a brief presentation of what I take to be the representational démarche in science, I stress the fundamental role of true judgements in model construction. The success and correctness of a representation rests on the truth of judgements which attribute properties to real targeted entities, cal...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2011-12-01
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Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n3p461/22390 |
Summary: | After a brief presentation of what I take to be the representational démarche in science, I stress the fundamental role of true judgements in model construction. The success and correctness of a representation rests on the truth of judgements which attribute properties to real targeted entities, called “ontic judgements”. I then present what van Fraassen calls “the Loss of Reality objection”. After criticizing his dissolution of the objection, I offer an alternative way of answering the Loss of Reality objection by showing that the contact of our models with reality is grounded on the truth of ontic judgements. I conclude by examining. |
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ISSN: | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |