A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games

A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games

The problem of strategic stability of cooperative solutions for multistage games is studied. The sufficient conditions related to discount factors are presented, which guarantee the existence of Nash or strong Nash equilibria in such games and therefore guarantee the strategic stability of cooperati...

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Main Authors: Lei Wang, Cui Liu, Juan Xue, Hongwei Gao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Hindawi Limited 2018-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/3293745
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spelling doaj-a6621f6f7910439a8df02fd324a61e872020-11-25T01:25:56ZengHindawi LimitedDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2018-01-01201810.1155/2018/32937453293745A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage GamesLei Wang0Cui Liu1Juan Xue2Hongwei Gao3School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, ChinaSchool of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, ChinaSchool of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, ChinaSchool of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, ChinaThe problem of strategic stability of cooperative solutions for multistage games is studied. The sufficient conditions related to discount factors are presented, which guarantee the existence of Nash or strong Nash equilibria in such games and therefore guarantee the strategic stability of cooperative solutions. The deviating payoffs of players are given directly, which are related closely to these conditions and avoid the loss of super-additivity of a class of general characteristic functions. As an illustration, Nash and strong Nash equilibria are found for the repeated infinite stage Prisoner’s dilemma game.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/3293745
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Lei Wang
Cui Liu
Juan Xue
Hongwei Gao
spellingShingle Lei Wang
Cui Liu
Juan Xue
Hongwei Gao
A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
author_facet Lei Wang
Cui Liu
Juan Xue
Hongwei Gao
author_sort Lei Wang
title A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games
title_short A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games
title_full A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games
title_fullStr A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games
title_full_unstemmed A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games
title_sort note on strategic stability of cooperative solutions for multistage games
publisher Hindawi Limited
series Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
issn 1026-0226
1607-887X
publishDate 2018-01-01
description The problem of strategic stability of cooperative solutions for multistage games is studied. The sufficient conditions related to discount factors are presented, which guarantee the existence of Nash or strong Nash equilibria in such games and therefore guarantee the strategic stability of cooperative solutions. The deviating payoffs of players are given directly, which are related closely to these conditions and avoid the loss of super-additivity of a class of general characteristic functions. As an illustration, Nash and strong Nash equilibria are found for the repeated infinite stage Prisoner’s dilemma game.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/3293745
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AT juanxue anoteonstrategicstabilityofcooperativesolutionsformultistagegames
AT hongweigao anoteonstrategicstabilityofcooperativesolutionsformultistagegames
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AT cuiliu noteonstrategicstabilityofcooperativesolutionsformultistagegames
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