Russell on Memory
Russell famously propounded scepticism about memory in The Analysis of Mind (1921). As he there acknowledged, one way to counter this sceptical position is to hold that memory involves direct acquaintance with past, and this is in fact a thesis Russell had advanced in The Problems of Philosophy (191...
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2001-12-01
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Online Access: | http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/17771/16353 |
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doaj-a949d1784acc43fd9ccd4d4861aeee9a2020-11-25T00:05:04ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112001-12-01051-2187208Russell on MemoryThomas BaldwinRussell famously propounded scepticism about memory in The Analysis of Mind (1921). As he there acknowledged, one way to counter this sceptical position is to hold that memory involves direct acquaintance with past, and this is in fact a thesis Russell had advanced in The Problems of Philosophy (1911). Indeed he had there used the case of memory to develop a sophisticated falibilist, non-sceptical, epistemology. By 1921, however, Russell had rejected the early conception of memory as incompatible with the neutral monism he now affirmed. In its place he argued that memory involves a distinctive type of belief whose content is given by imagery. Russell's language here is off-putting but without much distortion his later position can be interpreted as an early formulation of a functionalist theory of mind based on a causal theory of mental representation. Thus interpreted it provides the basis for a different response to Russell's sceptical thesis.http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/17771/16353Russellmemoryacquaintanceknowledgeneutral monismscepticism |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Thomas Baldwin |
spellingShingle |
Thomas Baldwin Russell on Memory Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology Russell memory acquaintance knowledge neutral monism scepticism |
author_facet |
Thomas Baldwin |
author_sort |
Thomas Baldwin |
title |
Russell on Memory |
title_short |
Russell on Memory |
title_full |
Russell on Memory |
title_fullStr |
Russell on Memory |
title_full_unstemmed |
Russell on Memory |
title_sort |
russell on memory |
publisher |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
series |
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
issn |
1414-4247 1808-1711 |
publishDate |
2001-12-01 |
description |
Russell famously propounded scepticism about memory in The Analysis of Mind (1921). As he there acknowledged, one way to counter this sceptical position is to hold that memory involves direct acquaintance with past, and this is in fact a thesis Russell had advanced in The Problems of Philosophy (1911). Indeed he had there used the case of memory to develop a sophisticated falibilist, non-sceptical, epistemology. By 1921, however, Russell had rejected the early conception of memory as incompatible with the neutral monism he now affirmed. In its place he argued that memory involves a distinctive type of belief whose content is given by imagery. Russell's language here is off-putting but without much distortion his later position can be interpreted as an early formulation of a functionalist theory of mind based on a causal theory of mental representation. Thus interpreted it provides the basis for a different response to Russell's sceptical thesis. |
topic |
Russell memory acquaintance knowledge neutral monism scepticism |
url |
http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/17771/16353 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT thomasbaldwin russellonmemory |
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