The Adoption of ‘Targeted Sanctions’ and the Potential for Inter-institutional Litigation after Lisbon

This article analyses the post-Lisbon legal framework for the adoption of restrictive measures against individuals or non-State entities – so-called ‘targeted sanctions’ or ‘smart sanctions’. It is argued that the procedural differences to adopt targeted sanctions in the framework of the EU’s counte...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Peter Van Elsuwege
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: UACES 2011-12-01
Series:Journal of Contemporary European Research
Subjects:
Online Access:http://jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/401/306
id doaj-b325827549124e95b4a6f3b208eddd5d
record_format Article
spelling doaj-b325827549124e95b4a6f3b208eddd5d2020-11-24T21:16:01ZengUACESJournal of Contemporary European Research1815-347X2011-12-0174488499The Adoption of ‘Targeted Sanctions’ and the Potential for Inter-institutional Litigation after LisbonPeter Van Elsuwege0Ghent UniversityThis article analyses the post-Lisbon legal framework for the adoption of restrictive measures against individuals or non-State entities – so-called ‘targeted sanctions’ or ‘smart sanctions’. It is argued that the procedural differences to adopt targeted sanctions in the framework of the EU’s counter-terrorism activities (Art. 75 TFEU) and with regard to the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Art. 215 TFEU) increase the potential for inter-institutional litigation. This is particularly the case because the boundaries between the EU’s competences in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are blurred. This is illustrated with the discussions surrounding the adoption of amendments to Regulation 881/2002 imposing restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The European Parliament contests the adoption of those amendments on the basis of Art. 215 (2) TFEU and argues that only Art. 75 TFEU is the appropriate legal basis given the counter-terrorism objective of the measure at stake. This article discusses the different options to find an appropriate solution for this inter-institutional competence battle and argues that the Court’s new possibilities to rule on the duty of consistency may help find a way out.http://jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/401/306SanctionsLisbon TreatyCoherenceCFSP
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Peter Van Elsuwege
spellingShingle Peter Van Elsuwege
The Adoption of ‘Targeted Sanctions’ and the Potential for Inter-institutional Litigation after Lisbon
Journal of Contemporary European Research
Sanctions
Lisbon Treaty
Coherence
CFSP
author_facet Peter Van Elsuwege
author_sort Peter Van Elsuwege
title The Adoption of ‘Targeted Sanctions’ and the Potential for Inter-institutional Litigation after Lisbon
title_short The Adoption of ‘Targeted Sanctions’ and the Potential for Inter-institutional Litigation after Lisbon
title_full The Adoption of ‘Targeted Sanctions’ and the Potential for Inter-institutional Litigation after Lisbon
title_fullStr The Adoption of ‘Targeted Sanctions’ and the Potential for Inter-institutional Litigation after Lisbon
title_full_unstemmed The Adoption of ‘Targeted Sanctions’ and the Potential for Inter-institutional Litigation after Lisbon
title_sort adoption of ‘targeted sanctions’ and the potential for inter-institutional litigation after lisbon
publisher UACES
series Journal of Contemporary European Research
issn 1815-347X
publishDate 2011-12-01
description This article analyses the post-Lisbon legal framework for the adoption of restrictive measures against individuals or non-State entities – so-called ‘targeted sanctions’ or ‘smart sanctions’. It is argued that the procedural differences to adopt targeted sanctions in the framework of the EU’s counter-terrorism activities (Art. 75 TFEU) and with regard to the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Art. 215 TFEU) increase the potential for inter-institutional litigation. This is particularly the case because the boundaries between the EU’s competences in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are blurred. This is illustrated with the discussions surrounding the adoption of amendments to Regulation 881/2002 imposing restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The European Parliament contests the adoption of those amendments on the basis of Art. 215 (2) TFEU and argues that only Art. 75 TFEU is the appropriate legal basis given the counter-terrorism objective of the measure at stake. This article discusses the different options to find an appropriate solution for this inter-institutional competence battle and argues that the Court’s new possibilities to rule on the duty of consistency may help find a way out.
topic Sanctions
Lisbon Treaty
Coherence
CFSP
url http://jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/401/306
work_keys_str_mv AT petervanelsuwege theadoptionoftargetedsanctionsandthepotentialforinterinstitutionallitigationafterlisbon
AT petervanelsuwege adoptionoftargetedsanctionsandthepotentialforinterinstitutionallitigationafterlisbon
_version_ 1726017527134289920