Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies
The negative zombie argument states that p&~q is ideally negatively conceivable and, therefore, possible, what would entail that physicalism is false (Chalmers, 2002, 2010}. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and $q$ is a phenomenal truth. A sentenc...
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doaj-b3997ff513d047f08da180b7cd44d1752020-11-24T21:31:58ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112017-11-01211415910.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p4127977Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombiesDanilo Fraga Dantas0PhD at University of California, Davis.The negative zombie argument states that p&~q is ideally negatively conceivable and, therefore, possible, what would entail that physicalism is false (Chalmers, 2002, 2010}. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and $q$ is a phenomenal truth. A sentence phi is ideally negatively conceivable iff phi cannot be ruled out a priori on ideal rational reflection. In this paper, I argue that if its premises are true, the negative zombie argument is neither conclusive (valid) nor a priori. First, I argue that the argument is sound iff there exists a finite ideal reasoner R for a logic x with the relevant properties which believes <>(p&~q) on the basis of not believing p->q on a priori basis. A finite reasoner is a reasoner with finite memory and finite computational power. I argue that if x has the relevant properties and R is finite, then x must be nonmonotonic and R may only approach ideallity at the limit of a reasoning sequence. This would render the argument nonconclusive. Finally, I argue that, for some q, R does not believe <>(p&~q) on the basis of not believing p->q on a priori basis. For example, for q=`someone is conscious'. I conclude that the negative zombie argument (and, maybe, all zombie arguments) is neither conclusive nor a priori (the choice of q relies on empirical information).https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/47922Modal epistemologyzombie argumentconceivability principlefinite reasoners |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Danilo Fraga Dantas |
spellingShingle |
Danilo Fraga Dantas Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology Modal epistemology zombie argument conceivability principle finite reasoners |
author_facet |
Danilo Fraga Dantas |
author_sort |
Danilo Fraga Dantas |
title |
Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies |
title_short |
Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies |
title_full |
Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies |
title_fullStr |
Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies |
title_full_unstemmed |
Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies |
title_sort |
ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies |
publisher |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
series |
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
issn |
1414-4247 1808-1711 |
publishDate |
2017-11-01 |
description |
The negative zombie argument states that p&~q is ideally negatively conceivable and, therefore, possible, what would entail that physicalism is false (Chalmers, 2002, 2010}. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and $q$ is a phenomenal truth. A sentence phi is ideally negatively conceivable iff phi cannot be ruled out a priori on ideal rational reflection. In this paper, I argue that if its premises are true, the negative zombie argument is neither conclusive (valid) nor a priori. First, I argue that the argument is sound iff there exists a finite ideal reasoner R for a logic x with the relevant properties which believes <>(p&~q) on the basis of not believing p->q on a priori basis. A finite reasoner is a reasoner with finite memory and finite computational power. I argue that if x has the relevant properties and R is finite, then x must be nonmonotonic and R may only approach ideallity at the limit of a reasoning sequence. This would render the argument nonconclusive. Finally, I argue that, for some q, R does not believe <>(p&~q) on the basis of not believing p->q on a priori basis. For example, for q=`someone is conscious'. I conclude that the negative zombie argument (and, maybe, all zombie arguments) is neither conclusive nor a priori (the choice of q relies on empirical information). |
topic |
Modal epistemology zombie argument conceivability principle finite reasoners |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/47922 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT danilofragadantas idealreasonersdontbelieveinzombies |
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