Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) subtype H5N1 has caused family case clusters, mostly in Southeast Asia, that could be due to human-to-human transmission. Should this virus, or another zoonotic influenza virus, gain the ability of sustained human-to-human transmission, an influenza pandemi...

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Main Authors: Yang Yang, M. Elizabeth Halloran, Jonathan D. Sugimoto, Ira M. Longini
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2007-09-01
Series:Emerging Infectious Diseases
Subjects:
Online Access:https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/13/9/07-0111_article
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spelling doaj-b60e0a13a36143a293fd21da2ef9ca702020-11-24T21:32:28ZengCenters for Disease Control and PreventionEmerging Infectious Diseases1080-60401080-60592007-09-011391348134810.3201/eid1309.070111Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)Yang YangM. Elizabeth HalloranJonathan D. SugimotoIra M. LonginiHighly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) subtype H5N1 has caused family case clusters, mostly in Southeast Asia, that could be due to human-to-human transmission. Should this virus, or another zoonotic influenza virus, gain the ability of sustained human-to-human transmission, an influenza pandemic could result. We used statistical methods to test whether observed clusters of HPAI (H5N1) illnesses in families in northern Sumatra, Indonesia, and eastern Turkey were due to human-to-human transmission. Given that human-to-human transmission occurs, we estimate the infection secondary attack rates (SARs) and the local basic reproductive number, R0. We find statistical evidence of human-to-human transmission (p = 0.009) in Sumatra but not in Turkey (p = 0.114). For Sumatra, the estimated household SAR was 29% (95% confidence interval [CI] 15%–51%). The estimated lower limit on the local R0 was 1.14 (95% CI 0.61–2.14). Effective HPAI (H5N1) surveillance, containment response, and field evaluation are essential to monitor and contain potential pandemic strains.https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/13/9/07-0111_articlehuman influenzaoutbreakssurveillancecontroldata analysismathematical model
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Yang Yang
M. Elizabeth Halloran
Jonathan D. Sugimoto
Ira M. Longini
spellingShingle Yang Yang
M. Elizabeth Halloran
Jonathan D. Sugimoto
Ira M. Longini
Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)
Emerging Infectious Diseases
human influenza
outbreaks
surveillance
control
data analysis
mathematical model
author_facet Yang Yang
M. Elizabeth Halloran
Jonathan D. Sugimoto
Ira M. Longini
author_sort Yang Yang
title Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)
title_short Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)
title_full Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)
title_fullStr Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)
title_full_unstemmed Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)
title_sort detecting human-to-human transmission of avian influenza a (h5n1)
publisher Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
series Emerging Infectious Diseases
issn 1080-6040
1080-6059
publishDate 2007-09-01
description Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) subtype H5N1 has caused family case clusters, mostly in Southeast Asia, that could be due to human-to-human transmission. Should this virus, or another zoonotic influenza virus, gain the ability of sustained human-to-human transmission, an influenza pandemic could result. We used statistical methods to test whether observed clusters of HPAI (H5N1) illnesses in families in northern Sumatra, Indonesia, and eastern Turkey were due to human-to-human transmission. Given that human-to-human transmission occurs, we estimate the infection secondary attack rates (SARs) and the local basic reproductive number, R0. We find statistical evidence of human-to-human transmission (p = 0.009) in Sumatra but not in Turkey (p = 0.114). For Sumatra, the estimated household SAR was 29% (95% confidence interval [CI] 15%–51%). The estimated lower limit on the local R0 was 1.14 (95% CI 0.61–2.14). Effective HPAI (H5N1) surveillance, containment response, and field evaluation are essential to monitor and contain potential pandemic strains.
topic human influenza
outbreaks
surveillance
control
data analysis
mathematical model
url https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/13/9/07-0111_article
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