Putting the Bite Back into "Two Dogmas"

• Main Author: Paul A. Gregory
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2003-12-01
• Series: Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
• Subjects: Quine; Carnap; analytic; analyticity; metaphysics; deflationism; Two Dogmas
• Online Access: http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14794/13506

Recent Carnap scholarship suggests that the received view of the Carnap-Quine analyticity debate is importantly mistaken. It has been suggested that Carnap’s analyticity distinction is immune from Quine’s criticisms. This is either because Quine did not understand Carnap’s use of analytic-ity, or because Quine did not appreciate that, rather than dispelling dog-mas, he was merely offering an alternate framework for philosophy. It has also been suggested that ultimately nothing of substance turns on this dis-pute. I am sympathetic to these reassessments and their rejection of the re-ceived view, but argue that they fail to pay proper attention to Carnap’s metaphysical deflationism. For it is there that Quine’s arguments ultimately make contact with Carnap, undermining his metaphysical deflationism. Moreover, the viability of deflationism is directly related to the viability of Carnap’s view of philosophy as methodologically distinct from science. Hence, Quine’s criticisms make contact with the deepest aspects of Car-nap’s views.