Trading networks with bilateral contracts
We study production networks in which firms match and sign bilateral contracts. Firms can buy from and sell to one another directly or via intermediaries. It is well-known that in this case group-stable outcomes might not exist. We show that the problem of determining whether an allocation is group-...
Main Authors: | Tamas Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Janko, Akihisa Tamura, Alexander Teytelboym |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
European Alliance for Innovation (EAI)
2016-12-01
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Series: | EAI Endorsed Transactions on Serious Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://eudl.eu/doi/10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260329 |
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