Evolution of Groupwise Cooperation: Generosity, Paradoxical Behavior, and Non-Linear Payoff Functions
Evolution of cooperation by reciprocity has been studied using two-player and <i>n</i>-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. An interesting feature specific to the <i>n</i>-player case is that players can vary in generosity, or how many defections they tolerate...
Main Authors: | Shun Kurokawa, Joe Yuichiro Wakano, Yasuo Ihara |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2018-12-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/100 |
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